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“Few sons, indeed are like their fathers.
Generally they are worse;
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Preface
This thesis is composed by three chapters dealing with the analysis of socioe-
conomic mobility in Italy. Socioeconomic mobility refers to people’s movements
through the social ladder. It can be thought in two different perspectives: inter-
generational and intragenerational.
The first chapter provides an analysis of the level of intergenerational mobility
in Italy using the Survey on Household Income and Wealth data (SHIW) (1998-
2010). Intergenerational mobility considers the position of the individual in the
social hierarchy in relation to that of his/her parents at a similar point in his/her
life.
I study the evolution of the intergenerational mobility in terms of educational at-
tainment and occupational status. This analysis shows some important results.
First, educational mobility appears to decrease and in particular, for a child is
more difficult to obtain an upper level of education than his/her father, especially
when the father has the university degree. Second, there is evidence of a strong
persistence in some occupations, that is, blue-collar, office worker/teacher and
member of professions. On the contrary, there is a decline in entrepreneurial jobs.
Moreover, the occupational mobility seems to be due to a change in the occupa-
tional structure and not to the result of the forces making for social mobility.
The second chapter deals with the study of intragenerational income mobility in
Italy for the period 1987 − 2010. The analysis provides two new methodologies
based on the estimate of the nonlinear specification of the Markovian model.
I propose two measures of income mobility: a local index consisting in the es-
timate of income elasticity conditioned to the level of (relative) income (Local
Income Elasticity); and three synthetic indexes, based on the estimated of the
stochastic kernel with continuous state space. These methodologies are applied to
a large sample of Italian individuals drawn from the SHIW dataset. The estimated
mobility appears highly nonlinear: it is significantly higher at the extreme bounds
of income distribution, but low in middle part of the the distribution. On average
income mobility in Italy results low compared to other developed countries.
In this chapter, I also propose a preliminary analysis of the relationship between
income mobility and income inequality. The results show that from 1987 − 1998
to 2000 − 2010, and according to the dynamics of the synthetic indexes, income
mobility doesn’t change a lot, while, income inequality increases.
The analysis of income mobility should take into account that household survey
data are likely to measure income with errors. Indeed, measurement error exagger-
ates the extent income mobility. The last chapter of this thesis tries to establish
if the dataset used in the empirical analysis is affected by measurement error and
if this error is classical or not. This analysis should help to acquire a better un-
derstanding both of the problems concerning measurement error and the type of
measurement error.
The empirical analysis compares two different dataset: the SHIW and the Work
Histories Italian Panel (WHIP); the latter is collected by Revelli’s Laboratory and
it is based on INPS administrative archives. I match them both to verify if SHIW
shows measurement error and to evaluate the empirical importance of classical and
non-classical measurement error. The main results display that both inequality
and mobility are affected by measurement error but this error is non-classical, that
is, mean reverting.
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Chapter 1
Intergenerational Mobility in
Italy in 1998-2010
1.1 Introduction
Intergenerational mobility considers the individual’s position in the social hierar-
chy in relation to that of his/her parents at a similar point in his/her life. Gen-
erally, low mobility is associated to higher inefficiency (most talented individuals
are not allocated in the best positions) and higher injustice (initial positions and
not individual efforts decides your welfare). These considerations justify the no-
table interest of economists and sociologists in the analysis of social mobility, even
though from different point of view.
In contemporary literature a key distinction is drawn between absolute and rela-
tive mobility. Absolute mobility refers the observed flows of individuals from each
actual class to different future classes. Relative mobility refers to the disparities in
the chances of arriving at certain destinations between people from different social
origins (Schizzerotto and Marzadro (2008)). In this chapter we study the level of
intergenerational mobility in relative terms.
Becker and Tomes (1979) explain that ”[...] the fortunes of children are linked to
their parents not only through [their] investment but also through endowments
1
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acquired from parents. The equilibrium income of children is determined by their
market and endowed luck, the own income and endowment of parents, and [...] the
degree of inheritability and the propensity to invest in children”. The economic
position of parents, their characteristics (e.g. genetic characteristics, education,
occupation, etc.), the environment where individuals take their decision (e.g. de-
veloped capital markets, secure property rights, degree of competition of markets,
etc.) and luck are the main explanatory variables of social mobility.
From an empirical point of view intergenerational mobility can be measured follow-
ing two main methodologies (see Checchi (1997)). The first estimates the elasticity
of offsprings’ economic conditions (measured by, e.g., income, educational attain-
ment, occupational status) with respect to parents’ ones. The second approach is
based on the estimate of Markov matrices ; mobility is measured in terms of the
probability of offspring to better/worse their economic conditions with respect to
the parents’ ones. Related to the second approach, some authors proposed a set
of mobility indexes, satisfying some welfare properties, calculated on the basis of
the estimated Markov matrices (see Shorrocks (1978b), Cowell (1985), Fields and
Ok (1996)).
The aim of this chapter is to study the evolution of the intergenerational mobil-
ity across Italian generations during the period 1998-2010 in terms of educational
attainment and occupational status following the second approach1.
Given the complexity of the mobility concept, first of all, we should define the con-
cept of a Perfect Mobile Society. We follow the definition given by Prais (1955):
“[...] a perfect mobile society is a society in which the probability of entering a
particular class is independent of the class of one’s father; [...] all the elements in
each row of the matrix would be substantially equal.”
In according to this definition, there will be infinitely many possible transition
matrices, and so infinitely perfectly mobile society, but he proposes to choose the
transition matrix corresponding to the perfect mobile society on the base of the
1The use of transition matrices allow us to analyze the movement of individuals across differ-
ent educational and occupational classes. Unfortunately, using transition matrices to measure
the level of occupational mobility does not allow us to understand the role played by father
background at different stages of the children carrier. On this point, Ganzeboom and Treiman
(2007) distinguish between the effect of parental occupation on child education (achievement)
and the additional effect on child occupation, given the child educational level (ascription).
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equilibrium distribution of the social classes. Therefore perfect mobile society is
based on the following assumptions: first, for a child, the conditional probability
to obtain a certain occupation is independent of the occupational class occupied
by his father; second, occupational class has to respect some constraints deriving
from occupational structure of the society and this is reflected in the equilibrium
distribution of social classes. These assumptions have important implications, in
particular in relation to the use of synthetic indexes. In the following, in fact, we
will show that these indexes not always assume their maximum value in presence
of a Perfect Mobile Society.
The data used in this analysis is a sample drawn from the “Survey on Household
Income and Wealth conducted by the Bank of Italy”. The sample is composed by
heads of household aged from 34 to 632. We divide the sample in three cohorts,
defined by the year of birth of heads of household, taking into account the struc-
ture of the society and the characteristics of the labour market that are different
in each cohort. Then we estimate the mobility in the period 1998-2010. To control
if and how the society is far from the perfect mobile one, we compare the mobility
indexes computed on the real transition matrices with mobility indexes computed
on the perfect mobility transition matrices.
The main results can be summarized as follow. Educational mobility appears to
decrease over the considered period. In particular, for the most recent Cohort,
for a child is more difficult to obtain an upper level of education than his father,
especially when the father has the university degree. This result is consistent with
others studies on educational mobility (see e.g. Checchi (2010)). In another study
Checci et al. (1999) compare the educational mobility in US with those in Italy.
They argue that Italy, despite the more centralised state school system, displays a
lower intergenerational upward mobility between education levels than US, which
has a bigger private education system. They offer a human capital explanation
building around the idea that even though it may be easier in Italy to move up
the social ladder the incentive to move may be lower making mobility less likely.
2The choice of the age of the respondents allows us to be sure that all children, who wish,
can obtain the higher level of education and occupation. Furthermore, the occupation declared
by the respondent can not be considered a temporary occupation.
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In the US system the fact that family background is less important than in the
Italian system in which education is centralised and public is a question that they
explicitly address in their paper. The prevalence of non-competitive labour mar-
kets and barriers to entry/exit into/from occupations can explain only part of
their observed evidence.
Transition matrices calculated for occupation show that the persistence in blue-
collar, office-worker/teacher and member of professions classes increases over the
considered period. On the contrary the persistence in small employer and member
of family business and manager/school head/magistrate classes decreased, point-
ing out a decline in entrepreneurial jobs. Overall mobility indexes point out a
reduction in mobility in occupational status for the most recent cohorts.
Our results are in line with a large empirical literature: e.g. ISTAT (2012) stresses
that the blue collar and office-worker classes show a high “power of attraction”:
many children, changing their occupation with respect to their fathers, have
moved towards the blue collar and office-worker/teacher classes. Furthermore,
the younger cohorts (that is those born after 1960) show a lower probability to
obtain a higher occupation that their fathers and a higher probability to worsen
their occupation. Also Carmichael (2000), using the BHPS, and Di Pietro and
Urwin (2003), using Italian data, using different methods, find strong relation-
ships between father and children occupations3. Corak and Piraino (2010), using
Canadian data, show that, by their early 30s, about 40% of men have worked with
an employer that had also employed their father at some point in time.
When we study the level of occupational mobility, we should keep in mind that
the occupational mobility observed could be due to changes in the occupational
structure and not to the result forces making for social mobility. For this reason,
following the method proposed by Prais (1955), we calculate the transition ma-
trices and the synthetic indexes taking into account the shifts in the occupational
structure and we find that in this case the level of occupational mobility is much
lower.
The last aspect treated in this chapter deals with gender differences in the level of
3It is also well established that children are more likely to become self-employed if a parent
is self-employed. See, e.g, Dunn and Douglas (2000).
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intergenerational educational and occupational mobility. The empirical literature
on intergenerational mobility has focused predominantly on sons. This analysis
can partly redresses that imbalance to investigate intergenerational mobility dis-
tinguishing between sons and daughters.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides a literature review on the
methodology used to measure intergenerational mobility, Section 1.3 introduces
Markov matrices as measure of social mobility and the indexes of social mobility
proposed by Shorrocks (1978b) and Bartholomew (1973) and based on Markov
matrix, discussing in particular their statistical properties. Empirical analysis
on Italian data is in Section 1.4 where we show the data and the results about
educational and occupational mobility. Subsection 1.4.4 presents how the level
of occupational mobility changes when we takes into account the changes in the
occupational structure. In Section 1.5 we present an extension of the analysis
studying the gender differences that can occur in the intergenerational mobility.
Section 1.6 contains some concluding remarks.
1.2 A Literature Review
The existing literature has examined intergenerational mobility in two ways: by
least square estimation of an autoregressive model linking children’s social status
(be it income, wealth, occupation or educational attainment) to the parent’s sta-
tus, and by the construction of transition matrix related to the children’s status
(measured by income, occupational status or educational attainment) to the par-
ent’s one.
In the first case the children’s status is expressed as a (linear) function of their
parents. Assuming that Yc is the permanent income (or its logarithm) of a child,
and Yp is the permanent income of his/her parents, then the process that generates
data can be expressed by the following equation:
Yc = α + βYp + ε (1.1)
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where ε is a random component usually assumed to be i.i.distributed as N(0, σ2).
The constant term represents the change in income common to the generation of
children, while the coefficient β provides a measure of the importance of parents
income. It is known as the intergenerational elasticity (henceforth, IGE) and
(1− β) is a measure of intergenerational mobility.
The magnitude of this coefficient varies between 0 and 1. If β is less than one the
income distribution is said to regress to the mean: parents with incomes above (or
below) the mean will have children with above (or below) average income levels,
but the deviation from the mean will not be as great. A high value of β indicates
that a child will inhabit the economic status of his parents, that is it reveals a
high persistence in intergenerational income levels. A value close to zero suggests
a mobile society in which a child’s income does not strongly depend on his parent’s
income4. The intergenerational correlation (ρ ) is an alternative to the elasticity
that has also been widely used in the literature.
The main limitation of this approach is that it does not provide information about
possible rank reversal of generations during the process. In other words, a single
estimated value for β can be associated with totally different situations.
A large set of studies have estimated the linear model and the majority of them
has usually been concerned about intergenerational persistence in earnings or in
income. For example, Becker and Tomes (1986) estimate the degree of intergen-
erational mobility of US in comparison with other rich countries. The estimate of
the β coefficient appears very low for United States (about 0.2) implying that the
inheritability of endowments in children are not large. However, this estimate is
biased downwards because of measurement error and sample selection problems
(see for example Atkinson et al. (1991), Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992)).
Behrman and Taubman (1990) present new estimates based on the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics. These estimates suggest correlations over 0.5 with longer-run
income and earning measures, as well, as some gender and race differences and
some impact of liquidity constraints. They also suggest that the intergenerational
elasticity is greater as parental income increases, the opposite of the Becker and
4If the income levels are expressed as natural logarithms then β represents the elasticity of a
child’s income with respect to the parental one.
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Tomes (1986) conjecture. Altonji and Dunn (1991) examine the links between
the labor market outcomes of individuals who are related by blood or by mar-
riage using panel data. They examine the intergenerational sibling correlations
among a broad set of labor market variables. Their primary findings are that
the intergenerational income correlation is 0.36 for father-son pairs and 0.48 for
father-daughter pairs.
In general, after Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992), the intergenerational elas-
ticity’s estimate tended to be at least 0.4 and possibly higher, thus depicting the
advanced countries, as US and UK, as a less mobile societies than had previously
been imagined.
The majority of earlier studies concerns the US; however, the availability of suffi-
ciently long panel data and the improvement in the econometric techniques, enable
us to have a wider perspective of international evidence. Bjo¨rklund and Ja¨ntti
(1997), Corak and Heisz (1999) and Piraino (2007) represent some examples.
Bjo¨rklund and Ja¨ntti (1997) present a new technique for estimating intergenera-
tional income correlations on independent samples of fathers and sons when data
on actual father-son pairs are unavailable. They compare United States with Swe-
den and they find that the United States has not the higher intergenerational
mobility. Sweden has both less income inequality and greater intergenerational
mobility. Corak and Heisz (1999) explore the degree of intergenerational income
mobility among Canadian men. Their analysis leads to the conclusion that the
intergenerational elasticity of father-son earnings and incomes is on average about
0.2. This finding is robust to several measurement and methodological issues raised
in the existing literature, including measurement error associated with transitory
income shocks, and life cycle differences between fathers and sons.
Finally, Piraino (2007) provides an analysis of degree of intergenerational eco-
nomic mobility in Italy. He estimates the intergenerational income elasticity for
Italy and shows that mobility is limited. From an overall comparison, the evidence
collocates Italy in the low-mobility group among advanced societies in the range
of values characterising the US and the UK.
Other studies are explicitly focused on the measurement of educational mobility.
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The first important contribution concerning this concrete topic is from Checci et al.
(1999), in which the authors compare educational mobility (and income inequal-
ity) in Italy and in the US, concluding that Italy has lower levels of mobility than
the US despite having lower levels of inequality. Comi (2003) compares earnings
and educational mobility in Europe, using the data from the young sample of the
ECHP; she reports low levels of mobility for countries in southern Europe, France
and Ireland, high levels for Nordic countries, the Netherlands and Austria and an
intermediate position for Belgium and Germany. Another study from Chevalier
et al. (2009) compare educational mobility within European countries using data
from the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS); their general results suggest
that educational mobility is negatively correlated with educational inequality and
that the degree of mobility has increased over time.
As regards occupational mobility, sociologists have mainly focused on this field.
For instance, Schizzerotto and Cobalti (1994) study occupational mobility in Italy
using a sample of 5,000 observations. They analyse the changes in the occupa-
tional structure and in the educational system that have marked the transition of
Italy from an agricultural to a post-industrial society. Despite these changes, the
family characteristics have a great influence on the children’s economic conditions.
Thus, Italy appears as a less mobile society.
The second approach to the study of intergenerational mobility consists in the
derivation of transition matrices. This approach is complementary to the use of
autoregressive models. The population should be divide into several classes ranked
according to a criterion.
The transition matrix is defined as the matrix P = [pij] ∈ <+, where pij is the
proportion of people that were in class i and now moved into class j. By definition,
we have
∑k
j=1 pij = 1, that is, a transition matrix is necessarily stochastic.
The value of the transition matrix is that it offers a more detailed depiction of
intergenerational mobility. It provides a picture of the movement of individuals
among the specified income (or occupational and educational) classes, and it can
thus be quite telling at times. Moreover, transition matrix lets one develop eas-
ily interpretable mobility measures. Shorrocks (1978b), Bartholomew (1996) and
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Fields and Ok (1996) provide a large discussion of the synthetic indexes used to
measure intergenerational mobility.
Atkinson (1980) presents preliminary evidence regarding the level of intergenera-
tional mobility in Britain. He examines some of the issues that arise in measuring
intergenerational mobility. The analysis suggests that Britain is characterized by
a low level of intergenerational mobility. Checci et al. (1999) apply the transition
matrices approach to measure the level of income and educational mobility be-
tween generations in Italy in comparison with the US. They also compute some
synthetic indexes and they find that, despite the centralised and public structure
of education and a low level of inequality, Italy has a lower level of mobility than
US.
The transition matrices approach, however, has a cost consisting in a loss of in-
formation. Since the transition matrix is stochastic, it implies that, in general,
one cannot induce the fathers and children’s marginal distributions by using only
the information provided by the matrix (see Fields and Ok (1996) for a discus-
sion of further various types of information loss which may occur by summarizing
distributional transformation by a transition matrix).
1.3 Social Mobility Measured by Mobility In-
dexes
We assume that social mobility can be entirely represented by Markov matrices,
which elements are called transition probabilities (see Bartholomew (1973)); in
particular, transition probabilities measure the probability of changes in social/in-
come/occupational classes occurring from one generation to the next one. Given
this assumption, on the base of the estimated transition probabilities, we can cal-
culate synthetic indexes of mobility called mobility indexes, which should provide
a measure of social mobility.
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In the next section we will provide a very short introduction to Markov Chains,
which are at the basic of Markov matrices; then in Section 1.3.2 we present a set
of mobility indexes and their statistical properties.
1.3.1 Basic on Markov Matrices
Here we adopt the terminology of Bartholomew (1996). Let be k all the possible
social/income/occupational classes which an individual can belong to, and nij
i, j = 1, ..., k be the number of individuals in the sample being in class i in the
first period and in class j in the next period. The total sample size is equal to
n =
∑k
i=1 ni. Define pij the probability that an individual in class i in current
period to move into class j in the next period, i.e.:
pij ≡ p(xt+1 = j) | (xt = i), (1.2)
where x is a random variable assuming values in the (k × k) state space (in our
particular case x can represent different social/income/occupational levels). As-
suming that state space is closed, i.e. k are all the possible realizations of x, we
have that:
k∑
j=1
pij = 1. (1.3)
We denote by P the transpose of the matrix of transition probabilities and denote
it Markov matrix. Assume that ni > 0 with i = 1, ..., k; then if P is regular, that is
all classes have non zero probability to ”receive” the system, there exists a unique
row vector pi = (pi1, ..., pik)
′ solving the equation
pi = P′pi. (1.4)
(see Bartholomew (1996)); pi is called the equilibrium vector (or ergodic distribu-
tion) as for any probability vector p0 the limit p
′
0 limt→∞P
t = pi′. Prais (1955)
shows that pi′ is independent of the unit of time in which the elements of P are
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measured. This is particular important for the application to social mobility be-
cause this means that if P is the Markov matrix measuring the mobility between
children and father, then P2 is the Markov matrix measuring the mobility between
grandson and grandfather.
1.3.2 Properties of Mobility Indexes
Shorrocks (1978b) lists some properties which an index of social mobility should
satisfy. The first is the Property of Monotonicity, which intuition can be grasped
considering two Markov matrices being equal but one off-diagonal element at the
expense of the diagonal element; then index of social mobility should be higher for
that matrix with the higher off-diagonal element, which means higher probability
to move between different classes and less probability to stay in the same class.
More formally, taken two Markov matrices Pa and Pb such that:
Pb  Pa, (1.5)
i.e. pb,ij ≥ pa,ij for all i 6= j and pb,ij > pa,ij for some i 6= j, the Property of
Monotonicity can be expressed as:
if Pb  Pa ⇒ I(Pb) > I(Pa). (1.6)
Property 1.6 provides a quasi-ordering over the set of all Markov matrices. Con-
sider for example the following Markov matrices:
Pa =

0.2 0.4 0.4
0.3 0.5 0.2
0.5 0 0.5
 Pb =

0 0.5 0.5
0.3 0.4 0.3
0.5 0.5 0

Pb presents a higher mobility than Pa, in fact the off-diagonal elements of Pb
are higher, or the same (for some i 6= j), than those of Pa. However Property
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1.6 does not provide a complete ordering of Markov matrices; consider instead the
following two Markov matrices:
Pc =

0.3 0.7 0
0.4 0.2 0.4
0.5 0 0.5
 Pd =

0.3 0.6 0.1
0.5 0.2 0.3
0 0.5 0.5

some off-diagonal elements of Pd are smaller than of those of Pc and viceversa;
therefore we cannot rank Pc and Pd according Property 1.6.
The Property of Monotonicity implies that a Markov matrix equal to the identity
matrix will be ranked lower in terms of social mobility than any other Markov
matrix. Since in such case no transition between classes takes place, Shorrocks
(1978b) assigns to the Markov matrix equal to the identity matrix the minimum
value of the index of mobility. This defines the Property of Immobility, i.e.
I(IM) = 0, (1.7)
where IM is the identity matrix.
A Markov matrix with identical rows and with transition probabilities in each row
equal to the transition probabilities of the ergodic distribution, denoted by PM ,
is usually called as the case of Perfect Mobile Society (see Prais (1955)). The
case of Perfect Mobile Society does not imply the maximum amount of movement
between classes, but we argue that the related index of mobility should reach its
maximum value, i.e. 1; accordingly, Property of Perfect Mobile Society requires
that:
I(PM) = 1 if PM = ux
′, (1.8)
where u = (1, 1, 1, ..., 1)′ and x′u = 1 and from which we have that: pi = x5.
This result is coherent with Prais approach where Perfect Mobility transition ma-
trix should have all rows equal to each other and equal to the ergodic distribution.
5We have that pi = P′pi and that P = ux′, thus, it follows that: pi = (ux′)′pi, pi = (xu′)pi, but
u′pi = 1, so pi = x
Chapter 1. Intergenerational Mobility. 13
An example of a such matrix is the following:
PM =

1/3 1/3 1/3
1/3 1/3 1/3
1/3 1/3 1/3
 (1.9)
A very disappointing result proved by Shorrocks (1978b) is that mobility indexes
generally satisfy the Property of Immobility, while Property of Monotonicity and
Property of Perfect Mobile Society can not be ever jointly satisfied.
In a context of occupational mobility, where occupational classes are ranked ac-
cording to a value judgement or to the median income paid by each occupation,
a society could want that all individuals move upwards reaching the maximum
occupation with highest social status/incomes. We can represent this situation by
the following matrix:
PU =

0 0 1
0 0 1
0 0 1
 (1.10)
This situation can be defined as an Utopian Mobile Society, in the sense that it can
not be feasible due to the supply side of the market labor, but it can be considered,
in terms of welfare, as the best situation.
If we are interested to relative position in the society (e.g. income related to the
sample average), matrix (1.10) is a non-sense.
A Perfect Mobile Society with ex-post Minimum Inequality can be represented by
the following matrix:
PE =

0 1 0
0 1 0
0 1 0
 (1.11)
In this case we measure mobility in relative terms and the central class contains
the average median of the distribution.
Chapter 1. Intergenerational Mobility. 14
1.3.3 Mobility Indexes Proposed in Literature
In the following we present the most important indexes of mobility proposed in
literature.
Shorrocks (1978b) proposed a simple index based on the determinant of P, i.e.:
ID(P) = 1− |det(P)| = 1− |
k∏
i=1
λi|, (1.12)
where λi represents the eigenvalues of P. ID has the serious drawback of taking
value 1 (maximum mobility) when any two rows (or columns) of the matrix are
identical.
Another mobility index proposed by Shorrocks (1978b) is:
IS(P) =
k − trace(P)
k − 1 . (1.13)
The range of IS is [0, k/(k − 1)] and a high value means high mobility. IS mea-
sures the average probability across all classes that an individual will leave her/his
initial class in the succeeding period (see Formby et al. (2004)); alternatively IS
can be viewed as normalized distance of P away from the identity matrix I (see
Bartholomew (1996)).
However, IS is calculated by considering only the main diagonal of P, thus com-
pletely ignoring the length/intensity of transitions. In this regard Bartholomew
(1973) has proposed:
IB(P) =
1
k − 1
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
piipij|i− j|, (1.14)
where pii is an element of the associated ergodic distribution of P. IB is in [0, 1],
with IB = 1 meaning that the society presents maximum mobility, whereas with
IB = 0 that there is no mobility. The basic intuition of IB = 1 is that transition
probabilities pij contributes to mobility in relation to i) the length of jump (the
Chapter 1. Intergenerational Mobility. 15
length/intensity of transition), i.e. |i − j|, and ii) how many individuals in equi-
librium are in a given class, i.e. pii. An important remark is that since IB weights
each transition probability pij with the absolute distance across states relative to
the same transition, i.e. |i − j|, the states should be defined taking increasing
or decreasing values of the variable measuring mobility (this will be particularly
important for the analysis of occupational status).
Unfortunately the metrics of states is not exactly defined in many circumstances,
i.e. the jump of two classes could imply much more mobility than twice the jump of
one class. To partially overcome this drawback Bartholomew (1973) has proposed:
IBM(P) =
1
(k − 1)2
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
piipij(i− j)2, (1.15)
where weights of transition probabilities are equal to the square of the length of
transitions. IBM is again in [0, 1].
Finally, also the mobility along the transition path can be interesting when the
convergence to equilibrium is very slow; the following index is proposed by Fiaschi
and Lavezzi (2004) and aims to measure such mobility:
IFL(P) =
1
k − 1
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
ni
n
pij|i− j|; (1.16)
IFL is similar to IB but instead of the elements of ergodic distribution it considers
ni/n which represent the actual distribution of observations across the different
states.
As example Table 1.1 reports the value of the mobility indexes just presented
calculated for different Markov matrices Pa, Pb, Pc, Pd, IM, PM, PU and PE.
All indexes satisfy the Property of Monotonicity (see Eq. (1.6)), being the mo-
bility index of Pa always lower than index of Pb for all indexes. Even though
the Property of Monotonicity cannot provide a complete order, mobility indexes
suggest that mobility is higher for Pc with respect to Pd with the exception of IS.
The Property of Immobility (see Eq. (1.7)) is satisfied by all indexes as they reach
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Table 1.1: Mobility indexes for different Markov matrices
Index Pa Pb Pc Pd IM PM PU PE
IS 0.92 1.27 0.99 1.03 0 1 1 1
IB 0.23 0.27 0.21 0.18 0 0.33 0 0
IBM 0.18 0.21 0.12 0.09 0 0.33 0 0
IFL 0.22 0.30 0.18 0.19 0 0.34 0.48 0.17
the minimum value of zero for the identity matrix IM. The Properties of Perfect
Mobile Society, Utopian Mobile Society and of Perfect Mobile Society with ex-post
Minimum Inequality are violated by all mobility indexes since they not reach their
maximum value.
1.3.4 Statistical Properties of the Estimates
The maximum likelihood (ML) estimator of P, Pˆ, is given by:
Pˆ = [pˆij] =
[
nij
ni
]
, (1.17)
where ni = Σ
n
j=1nij (see, e.g., (Norris, 1997, pp.55-56)). Pˆ being the ML estimator,
these estimates are consistent.
In general, consider P and a function I such that I : P→ <. Since P is unknown,
then I (P) is unknown as well. A natural estimator is Iˆ = I
(
Pˆ
)
, which, in turn, is
consistent (see Trede (1999)). I can represent any function (linear and non-linear),
e.g. a mobility index calculated on P.
Stuart and Ord (2004) show that the distribution of ~ni converges to a n-variate
normal distribution, with means nipij, variances nipij (1− pij) and covariances
cov (nij, niq) = −nipijpiq. Thus √ni (pˆij − pij) tends towards the normal distribu-
tion N (0; pij (1− pij)).
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Since the rows of P are independent and each row tends towards a n-variate normal
distribution, we have
√
n
(
vec
(
Pˆ′ −P′
))
d−→ N (0,V) ,
where
V =

V1
...
Vk
 (1.18)
is a block diagonal with
Vm = [vm,ij] =

pmi(1−pmi)
pm
for i = j
−pmipmj
pm
for i 6= j
for m = 1, ..., k and 0 elsewhere.
Therefore the asymptotic distribution of I is given by:
√
n
(
I
(
Pˆ
)
− I (P)
)
d−→ N (0, σ2I) . (1.19)
An estimate of the variance of the index, σˆ2I , can be obtained by a bootstrap
procedure on transition matrix.
Since I (P) is normally distributed, then (1− α)-confidence interval for I (P) is
I
(
Pˆ
)
± c σˆI√
n
, (1.20)
where c is the
(
1− α
2
)
-quantile of the N (0, 1). Alternatively,
s =
I
(
Pˆ
)
− I (P)
σˆI√
n
(1.21)
converges towards a Gaussian distribution under the null hypothesis I
(
Pˆ
)
=
I (P).
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Finally, given two transition matrices Pˆ1and Pˆ2, we have that:
s =
I
(
Pˆ1
)
− I
(
Pˆ2
)
√
σˆ2I1
n1
+
σˆ2I2
n2
, (1.22)
converges towards a Gaussian distribution under the null hypothesis I
(
Pˆ1
)
=
I
(
Pˆ2
)
.
Test of hypotheses directly follow from the statistical properties of indexes. As-
sume that every pij > 0. The test of equality of pij to a given p
0
ij is based on the
fact that
√
ni(pˆij − p0ij) has a limiting normal distribution with means zero, and
variance and covariance depending on p0ij. Therefore the hypothesis H0 of equality
of the i-th row of a Markov matrix to p0ij, i.e.:
H0 : pij = p
0
ij for j = 1, ..., k for a given i. (1.23)
can be tested observing that:
k∑
j=1
ni
(pˆij − p0ij)2
p0ij
(1.24)
has an asymptotic χ2-distribution with k − 1 degrees of freedom (see Anderson
and Goodman (1957)).
In the same manner, take the i-th row, the test if pij(t) is independent of t,
i.e. pˆij(t) are not statistically different for T independent samples, can be tested
observing that:
k∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
ni(t− 1)[pˆij(t)− pˆij]2/pˆij, (1.25)
where pˆij are estimated pooling all T samples, has a χ
2
i -limiting distribution
with(k − 1)(T − 1) degrees of freedom.
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Finally, given the normal distribution of the estimate of each mobility index, test
of equality between two mobility indices I(Pˆ1) and I(Pˆ2), i.e.:
I(Pˆ1)− I(Pˆ2)√
σˆ1
2
n1
+ σˆ2
2
n2
(1.26)
where σˆ1
2 and σˆ2
2 are the estimated variances of indexes I(P1) and I(P2), con-
verges towards a Gaussian distribution under the null hypothesis I ˆ(P1) = I(Pˆ2).
1.4 Empirical Analysis
In the following we will study the intergenerational mobility across Italian house-
holds in terms of their educational attainment and occupational status for three
different cohorts.
The cohorts are defined by the year of birth of heads of household: the first co-
horts includes the heads of household born in the period 1947-1956 (Cohort I), the
second one those born between 1957 and 1966 (Cohort II) and the third one those
born between 1967 and 1976 (Cohort III)6. This choice derives from the idea that
the three periods are characterized by different level of society’s openness and by
a different labour market.
1.4.1 The Dataset
The dataset used in this chapter is build from a survey conducted by Bank of
Italy, the “Survey on Household Income and Wealth”(SHIW ), a nationally rep-
resentative household survey based on a random sample of approximately 8, 000
households, that is available from 1977 to 1986 annually and at odd years after
1987. The survey includes data on income, occupation, housing, retirements and
education.
6Dataset and codes written in R are available on authors’ website.
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We consider the last six waves covering the period 1998-2010, and, in particular,
we consider all heads of household aged from 34 up to 63 (i.e born between 1947
and 1976). We restrict our attention to these waves because all heads of household
are asked to recall some characteristics of their parents, among which year of birth,
educational attainment and occupational status, indicatively referred to the same
current age of the respondent. Given the available information in the SHIW we
will measure social mobility by changes in educational attainment and occupa-
tional status between children and fathers7. Overall we have a sample of 12, 836
observations for the educational attainment and of 10, 685 for occupational status.
We removed those heads of household not giving informations on their fathers (i.e.
3, 718 observations for educational attainment and 3, 200 for occupational status)
and the repeated observations due to longitudinal component (panel) present in
the waves (about 30% of households persists from a wave and the next one).
1.4.2 Intergenerational Educational Mobility
Education attainment is measured by the maximum educational attainment. In
particular, we consider five classes: None Education (NE), Primary School (PS)
(five years), Lower Secondary School (LSS) (eight years), Upper Secondary School
(USS) (thirteen years) and University Degree (UD) (eighteen and more than eigh-
teen years of education)8.
To our scopes the presence of a compulsory regime of education introduces a crucial
bias in the estimate of intergenerational educational mobility. In the considered
period there was a progressive increase in the years of compulsory school: at the
7Other studies that use these two variables are Piraino (2007) and Checci et al. (1999). We
select only fathers to follow the standard procedure adopted in most of similar studies of social
mobility (e.g. Checchi (1997) and Piraino (2007))
8The classification into five classes, both for children and their fathers, is based on the data
retrieved in the questionnaire of Bank of Italy (respectively card A16 and card A24). As regard
sons, the first class corresponds to the answer 1 (None Education) of the card A16, the second
one corresponds to the answer 2 (Primary School), the third corresponds to the answer 3 (Lower
Secondary School), the fourth category corresponds to the answers 4 and 5 (Vocational and Upper
Secondary School) and the last one corresponds to the answers 6, 7 and 8 (Three and Five year
University Degree and Postgraduate Qualification). For fathers, the first three classes are similar
to those of children, while the fourth class corresponds to the answer 4 (Upper Secondary School)
of the card A24, and the last class corresponds to the answers 5 and 6 (University Degree and
Postgraduate Qualification).
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beginning of period (1947) the compulsory age of education was 10 years; in 1962
a reform raised years to 14 (lower secondary school in our classification).
In order to take into account the presence and the changes in the compulsory
regimes of education we use only three classes of educational attainment, where
the first includes NE, PS and LSS (denote it CS), the second USS and the third
UD.
Tables 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 report the estimate of transition probabilities between the
three educational classes for three cohorts.
Table 1.2: The estimated transition matrix of educational
attainment for Cohort I (1947-1956).
Fathers\ Children CS USS UD N.Obs.
CS 0.579 0.339 0.080 4457
USS 0.093 0.480 0.425 346
UD 0.087 0.373 0.539 169
N.Obs. 2579 1785 608 4972
Table 1.3: The estimated transition matrix of educational
attainment for Cohort II (1957-1966).
Fathers\Children CS USS UD N.Obs.
CS 0.479 0.446 0.073 4262
USS 0.052 0.570 0.377 489
UD 0.047 0.342 0.610 212
N.Obs. 2095 2238 630 4963
Table 1.4: The estimated transition matrix of educational
attainment for Cohort III (1967-1976).
Fathers\Children CS. USS UD N.Obs.
CS 0.470 0.439 0.090 2330
USS 0.070 0.607 0.322 430
UD 0.028 0.258 0.712 141
N.Obs. 1137 1336 428 2901
As expected during the considered period there was a general increase in the level
of educational attainment of children with respect to fathers for all three cohorts.
Elements above the main diagonal in transition matrices are indeed generally
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higher than elements below the main diagonal and the changes in the distributions
of fathers and children across the three classes tends to favour classes USS and
UD in all three cohorts (see Tables 1.8, 1.9 and 1.10). The overall impression is,
however, that the advance in educational attainment was very strong for Cohort
I, much less strong for Cohort II and, very weak for Cohort III. These findings
are consistent with the results in Checchi (2010), who uses the same dataset but
apply a different methodology of analysis (the estimate of elasticities).
Tables 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 show that the persistence increases from Cohort I to Cohort
III for classes USS and UD (0.48 vs 0.57 and 061 for USS and 0.54 vs 0.61 and 0.71
for UD) and decreased for CS (0.58 vs 0.48 and 0.47).9 The estimates of index
IS reported in Table 1.5 suggests that the overall educational mobility decreased
from Cohort I to Cohort III. Tests of equality between IS of Cohort I and Cohort
III and between IS of Cohort II and Cohort III is rejected at 1% significance level
(see Table 1.6).
The off-diagonal elements stress that the probability that a child with a father
in class CS of obtaining a higher educational attainment than the one of his/her
father is increasing from Cohort I to Cohort III, but not from Cohort II to Cohort
III (0.34 vs 0.45 and 0.44)10. On the contrary, the probability that a child with
a father in class USS takes an UD decreases from Cohort I to Cohort III (0.43
vs 0.37 and 0.32)11. Checchi (2010) discusses a similar evidence. This finding
is particularly puzzling since both the dynamics of the demand side of labour
market, thanks to changes in technology in favour of more skilled workers, and
the dynamics of supply side of labour market, thanks to the reduction in the
imperfections of capital market and the higher wealth of household, would suggest
that UD should be more likely over time independent of the class of educational
attainment of parents (father).
9The null hypothesis of equality for all these transition probabilities can be rejected at the
usual confidence level of 5%.
10We can reject the null hypothesis of equality between the transition probabilities of Cohort
I and II at the usual confidence level of 5%.
11We can reject the null hypothesis of equality for all these transition probabilities at the usual
confidence level of 5%.
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Table 1.5: Mobility indices of educational attainment for the three
different cohorts.
Index\Cohort I (1947− 1956) II (1957− 1966) III (1967− 1976) (1947− 1976)
IS 0.68
(0.022)
0.67
(0.019)
0.605
(0.022)
0.643
(0.013)
IB 0.131
(0.006)
0.112
(0.005)
0.093
(0.007)
0.111
(0.003)
IBM 0.072
(0.003)
0.059
(0.003)
0.052
(0.004)
0.065
(0.002)
IFL 0.239
(0.004)
0.274
(0.004)
0.273
(0.005)
0.263
(0.00)
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis; they are computed via a bootstrap procedure with
300 bootstraps (see Efron and Tibshirani (1993))
Indexes IB and IBM confirm that the overall educational mobility decreased from
Cohort I to Cohort III (see Table 1.5). Test of equality between indexes IB and
IBM of Cohort I and III and between Cohort II and III are all rejected at 5%
confidence level. Index IFL shows a different dynamic: from Cohort I to Cohort II
the index increases and the two values are statistically different at 5% confidence
level. From Cohort II to Cohort III IFL decreases but from the test of equality we
conclude that the values of the indexes are not statistically different (see Table1.6).
Table 1.6: P-values of the test of equality between mobility indexes
of different Cohorts.
Index\Cohort I vs III II vs III
IS 0.007 0.013
IB 0 0.017
IBM 0 0.042
IFL 0.047 0.454
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, a Perfect Mobile Society is rep-
resented by a transition matrix where the probability of entering a particular class
is independent of the class of one’s father and where its elements are equal to those
of the ergodic distribution. We construct this transition matrix for all cohorts and
we apply the mobility indexes to it.
Table 1.7 shows the ratio between the mobility indexes computed on the actual
transition matrices and the mobility indexes computed on the perfect mobility
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transition matrices. This ratio gives an idea of how a society is far from being
a perfectly mobile society and it allows us to avoid the problem concerning the
structural occupational changes that occur in the society over the considered pe-
riod.
IFL displays a ratio greater than 1, but it is due to the fact that it weights the tran-
sition probabilities with the actual distribution, whereas when it is computed on
the perfect mobility’s transition matrix, the transition probabilities are weighted
by the ergodic distribution being the latter equal to the actual distribution.
The Table 1.7 suggests that from Cohort I to Cohort III, the educational mobil-
ity tends to decrease. In particular for IS and IB, the ratio decreases of 0.8 and
0.10 percentage points12. This result shows an increase of the “distance” from the
perfect mobility.
Table 1.7: “Distance” from a Perfect Mobile Society
Index\Cohort I (1947− 1956) II (1957− 1966) III (1967− 1976) (1947− 1976)
IS 0.68
(0.043)
0.67
(0.04)
0.60
(0.039)
0.64
(0.038)
IB 0.67
(0.013)
0.68
(0.012)
0.57
(0.011)
0.63
(0.013)
IBM 0.53
(0.012)
0.57
(0.01)
0.51
(0.009)
0.58
(0.011)
IFL 1.22
(0.016)
1.66
(0.013)
1.68
(0.015)
1.52
(0.013)
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis; they are computed via a bootstrap procedure with
300 bootstraps (see Efron and Tibshirani (1993))
The ergodic distributions reported in Tables 1.8, 1.9 and 1.10 highlight how the
distribution dynamics is far to be exhausted: the mass of class UD of the youngest
children should increase from 0.15 (the mass of actual children in Cohort III) to
0.50 in the long run; at the same time class CS should decrease from 0.40 to 0.08.
The ergodic distributions of Cohorts II and III appear very similar, confirming the
previous intuition that not appreciable changes in the distributional dynamics of
educational attainment happened in the two periods.
12For all indexes, we can reject the null hypothesis of equality at 5% level of confidence.
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Table 1.8: The ergodic distribution of educational attainment for
Cohort I (1947-1956).
CS USS UD
Distribution of Fathers 0.89 0.07 0.03
Distribution of Children 0.52 0.36 0.12
Ergodic Distribution 0.18 0.40 0.42
Table 1.9: The ergodic distribution of educational attainment for
Cohort II (1957-1966).
CS USS UD
Distribution of Fathers 0.85 0.09 0.04
Distribution of Children 0.42 0.45 0.12
Ergodic Distribution 0.09 0.45 0.46
Table 1.10: The ergodic distribution of educational attainment for
Cohort III (1967-1976).
CS USS UD
Distribution of Fathers 0.80 0.14 0.05
Distribution of Children 0.40 0.46 0.15
Ergodic Distribution 0.08 0.42 0.50
1.4.3 Intergenerational Occupational Mobility
A first step in the analysis of intergenerational occupational mobility is the defi-
nition of the ranking of possible occupations. Following a standard methodology
used in literature (see Checci et al. (1999)) we rank occupations according to the
median earning of children.13 This method is different from that used by soci-
ologists (see e.g. Schizzerotto and Cobalti (1994)) where occupation are ranked
according to the collective assessment of the degree of social advantage associated
with each occupation. The income variable is obtained as the sum between the
13Cowell and Schluter (1998) suggest that the use of categorical data should increase the
robustness of mobility measures especially when we use data on income profile. They demonstrate
that to obtain robust estimates of transition probabilities it is necessary make a robust choice of
income classes.
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net wages and net self-employment income.14
In the absence of direct information about parent actual income, we cannot pro-
vide a generation specific ranking and we are forced to use the same ranking for
both generations. One could object that each generation should possess its own
ranking, which reflect events specific to that age cohort (degree of industrial devel-
opment, wars, etc.), but data availability prevents this possibility (see also Checci
et al. (1999)).
On the basis of figures in Table A.4, A.5, A.6 (reported in Appendix A.3) we define
seven occupational classes: Unemployed (UN), Blue-Collar (BC), Small Employer
and Member of Family Business (SE&FB), Own Account Worker (OAW), Office-
Worker/Teacher (OW&T), Member of Professions (MP), and Manager/School
Head/Magistrate (M&M)15.
The persistence in occupation between generations is strongly changed in the three
cohorts. Tables 1.11, 1.12 and 1.13 contain the estimate of transition probabilities
between the seven classes for the three cohorts. The persistence in BC and OW&T
is strongly increased from Cohort I to Cohort III (0.42 vs 0.57 and 0.45 vs 0.54
respectively); persistence in class MP also increased (0.20 vs 0.28)16. We argue
that the higher persistence in BC signals a lower mobility of people with a lower
median income.
The higher persistence in OW&T is instead likely due to the increase in public
job17. Finally, the increase of persistence of class MP is probably due to the strong
14In Appendix A.3 there is the ranking of occupation according to the median income. For
Cohort III, we consider the OW&T class below the OAW class because, despite they have the
same median income, the former shows a higher mean value.
15In the questionnaire of Bank of Italy for children we refer to card B01: the first class
corresponds to the answer 12 (Unemployed), the second one corresponds to answers 1 (Blue-
Collar),the third one corresponds to answers 7 and 9 (Small Employer and Member of Family
Business), the fourth class corresponds to the answer 8 (Own Account Worker), the fifth one
corresponds to answers 2 and 3 (Office Worker and Teacher), the sixth class corresponds to answer
6 (Member of Professions), and the last one corresponds to the answers 4 and 5 (Junior/Middle
Manager and Senior Manager/Official/School Head and Magistrate). As regards father we refer
to card A25: the first class corresponds to the answer 9 (Unemployed), the fourth one contains
only small employers, the other classes correspond to the same answers of those of children.
16We can reject the null hypothesis of equality for all these transition probabilities at the
usual confidence level of 5% for class BC and OW&T. For class MP we can not refused the null
hypothesis at the usual confidence level.
17Sylos Labini (1995) shows that the ”demographic” crisis of the working class during ’80s
and ’90s provided the demand for new types of jobs in the service sectors. This entailed in a
progressive increase in the workforce in the public sector.
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regulation of professions in Italy or to the increase of barrier to entry in many pro-
fessions (e.g. for lawyers, public notary, etc. see Bortolotti and Fiorentini (1997)
and Brosio (1997)). This result is consistent with findings of others studies on
social mobility in Italy, in brief: a high incidence of inheritabilitys phenomena
of the highest position and the capability of highest occupational groups to pro-
tect their own heirs from occupying lower positions (see Schizzerotto and Cobalti
(1994) and Schizzerotto (2002)). The persistence in classes SE&FB and M&M is
strongly decreased (0.20 vs 0.12 and 0.33 vs 0.19)18.
Index IS reported in Table 1.14 decreases from Cohort I to Cohort III but, not
surprisingly, the test of equality cannot be rejected at conventional statistical level
of significance (see Table 1.15).
Comparing the off-diagonal elements it emerges how the probabilities of entry into
class BC from all the other classes (except UN) are strongly higher in Cohorts III
with respect to Cohort I, while exactly the opposite holds for class M&M. Mobility
therefore displays a downward trend, in the sense that classes of occupations with
low median income tend to increase their mass. Mobility indexes IB, IBM and IFL
reported in Table 1.14 point out a reduction in mobility from Cohort I to Cohort
III, but this decrease is statistically significant at usual confidence level only from
Cohort I to Cohort II (see Table 1.15, except IBM). Overall we therefore find
that mobility decreased over time and that mobility is mainly towards classes of
occupation with low incomes.
Table 1.16 displays the ratio between mobility indexes computed on the actual
transition matrices and those computed on the perfect mobility’s transition ma-
trices. We observe that, unlike educational mobility, the ratio is higher showing
that the society is nearest to the perfect mobility situation. Also in this case, IFL
for Cohort I, shows a value greater than 1, but, it is due to its computation.
Furthermore, Table 1.16 highlights that, from Cohort I to Cohort III, the ratio de-
creases, in particular for IB, IBM and IFL, suggesting an increased of the distance
18We can reject the null hypothesis of equality for all these transition probabilities at the usual
confidence level of 5%.
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Table 1.11: The estimated transition matrix of occupational
status for Cohort I (1947-1956).
Fathers\Children UN BC SE&FB OAW OW&T MP M&M N.Obs.
UN 0.095 0.294 0.027 0.123 0.205 0.085 0.168 69
BC 0.055 0.423 0.044 0.0899 0.281 0.043 0.061 2013
SE&FB 0.048 0.079 0.200 0.051 0.339 0.156 0.124 83
OAW 0.051 0.215 0.106 0.187 0.301 0.063 0.072 847
OW&T 0.024 0.143 0.026 0.062 0.448 0.094 0.203 552
MP 0.031 0.032 0.052 0.106 0.156 0.204 0.416 77
M&M 0.042 0.056 0.049 0.045 0.342 0.131 0.332 206
N.Obs. 213 1119 207 382 1248 249 429 3847
Table 1.12: The estimated transition matrix of occupational
status for Cohort II (1957-1966).
Fathers\Children UN BC SE&FB OAW. OW&T MP M&M N.Obs.
UN 0.072 0.256 0.015 0.163 0.363 0.013 0.116 74
BC 0.058 0.490 0.036 0.083 0.248 0.029 0.053 2223
SE&FB 0.038 0.178 0.156 0.123 0.309 0.131 0.061 93
OAW. 0.041 0.277 0.086 0.178 0.304 0.053 0.058 810
OW&T 0.022 0.162 0.011 0.073 0.503 0.104 0.124 752
MP 0.019 0.129 0.068 0.127 0.173 0.305 0.175 133
M&M 0.020 0.032 0.020 0.059 0.427 0.122 0.321 253
N.Obs. 212 1420 182 424 1442 293 365 4338
Table 1.13: The estimated transition matrix of occupational
status for Cohort III (1967-1976).
Fathers\Children UN BC SE&FB OAW. OW&T MP M&M N.Obs.
UN 0.082 0.431 0.059 0.029 0.261 0.072 0.063 57
BC 0.045 0.576 0.018 0.052 0.257 0.025 0.023 1249
SE&FB 0.132 0.187 0.119 0.079 0.243 0.121 0.115 60
OAW. 0.039 0.341 0.096 0.177 0.257 0.028 0.059 446
OW&T 0.025 0.197 0.022 0.039 0.541 0.066 0.108 477
MP 0.035 0.138 0.011 0.021 0.449 0.280 0.062 74
M&M 0.017 0.120 0.020 0.085 0.432 0.128 0.195 137
N.Obs 130 1020 98 198 793 119 142 2500
from a Perfect Mobile Society19. This result confirms the decreased of occupational
mobility over the considered period.
19We can reject the null hypothesis of equality between ratios at a 5% level of confidence for
IB , IBM and IFL.
Chapter 1. Intergenerational Mobility. 29
Table 1.14: Mobility indices of occupational status for the three dif-
ferent cohorts.
Index\Cohort I (1947− 1956) II (1957− 1966) III (1967− 1976) (1947− 1976)
IS 0.851
(0.014)
0.829
(0.012)
0.838
(0.014)
0.835
(0.008)
IB 0.123
(0.004)
0.111
(0.002)
0.107
(0.003)
0.114
(0.002)
IBM 0.058
(0.003)
0.053
(0.002)
0.052
(0.002)
0.055
(0.001)
IFL 0.187
(0.004)
0.157
(0.003)
0.132
(0.004)
0.159
(0.002)
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis; they are computed via a bootstrap procedure with
300 bootstraps (see Efron and Tibshirani (1993))
Table 1.15: P-value of the test of equality between mobility indexes
of Cohorts.
Index\Cohort I vs III II vs III
IS 0.24 0.68
IB 0.00 0.13
IBM 0.03 0.38
IFL 0 0
Table 1.16: “Distance” from a Perfect Mobile Society
Index\Cohort I (1947− 1956) II (1957− 1966) III (1967− 1976) (1947− 1976)
IS 0.85
(0.02)
0.83
(0.01)
0.84
(0.013)
0.84
(0.009)
IB 0.73
(0.005)
0.69
(0.004)
0.67
(0.003)
0.59
(0.001)
IBM 0.63
(0.004)
0.67
(0.002)
0.60
(0.002)
0.51
(0.001)
IFL 1.12
(0.003)
0.97
(0.003)
0.82
(0.005)
0.82
(0.001)
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis; they are computed via a bootstrap procedure with
300 bootstraps (see Efron and Tibshirani (1993))
The distribution of children across occupation and ergodic distributions reported
in Tables 1.17, 1.18, and 1.19 confirm this finding: the mass of BC of children is
equal to 0.29 in Cohort I and 0.41 in Cohort III, while the mass of M&M is 0.11
in Cohort I and 0.05 in Cohort III; looking at ergodic distributions this dynamics
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is still more evident (0.17 vs 0.33 and 0.22 vs 0.08)20. Furthermore the mass of
SE&FB decreases from Cohort I to Cohort III both for children and for ergodic
distribution (0.05 vs 0.04 and 0.05 vs 0.03)21. Class OW&T appears how the class
receiving the main inflows, but its mass is almost constant over time (also its mass
in the ergodic distributions). Finally, we observe that the mass of classes SE&FB
and M&M, which include more entrepreneurial jobs, display an ongoing reduction
from Cohort I to Cohort III declining from an overall mass of 0.16 in Cohort I to
0.09 in Cohort III for children and from 0.27 to 0.11 in the ergodic distribution
(see Tables 1.17, 1.18, and 1.19).
Table 1.17: The estimated ergodic distribution of occupational status
for Cohort I (1947-1956).
UN BC SE&FB OAW. OW&T MP M&M
Distribution of Fathers 0.02 0.52 0.02 0.22 0.14 0.02 0.05
Distribution of Children 0.05 0.29 0.05 0.10 0.32 0.06 0.11
Ergodic Distribution 0.04 0.17 0.05 0.08 0.34 0.11 0.21
Table 1.18: The estimated ergodic distribution of occupational status
for Cohort II (1957-1966).
UN BC SE&FB OAW. OW&T MP M&M
Distribution of Fathers 0.02 0.51 0.02 0.19 0.17 0.03 0.06
Distribution of Children 0.05 0.33 0.04 0.10 0.33 0.07 0.08
Ergodic Distribution 0.03 0.23 0.04 0.09 0.37 0.10 0.13
Table 1.19: The estimated ergodic distribution of occupational status
for Cohort III (1967-1976).
UN BC SE&FB OAW. OW&T MP M&M
Distribution of Fathers 0.02 0.50 0.02 0.18 0.19 0.03 0.05
Distribution of Children 0.05 0.41 0.04 0.08 0.32 0.05 0.05
Ergodic Distribution 0.04 0.33 0.03 0.05 0.40 0.07 0.08
20We can reject the null hypothesis of equality for all the elements of the ergodic distribution
at the usual level of confidence of 5%.
21We can reject the null hypothesis of equality for all the elements of the ergodic distribution
at the usual level of confidence of 5%.
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1.4.4 A Correction for the Occupational Mobility
The ergodic distributions presented in Tables 1.17, 1.18, and 1.19 show that there
are differences between the observed distributions of fathers and children. In the
main part of the text the differences have been attributed to the results of the
forces making for social mobility as described by transition matrix. This result
should be ascribed to extraneous factors such as shifts in the occupational struc-
ture, a change on the supply side or differences in the reproduction rates of the
classes. Prais (1955) proposes a method to take into account these changes.
The observed transition matrix P can be considered as the result of two differ-
ent effects: i) resulting from social mobility, represented by a matrix Q, and ii)
resulting from occupational shifts, represented by a matrix R, such that:
P = QR, (1.27)
Prais (1955) makes an assumption to estimate the elements in R: the numbers in
any class after the change in the occupational structure are composed of a weighted
average of those in that class and in one of the adjacent classes before the change.
This assumption implies that there be only a minimal change between classes. As
regards our analysis, first we apply this method to construct the new transition
matrix Q for each Cohort and then we calculate the synthetic indexes using the
new matrix. Table 1.20 shows the derivation of the matrix R for the first Cohort.
The actual distribution of the fathers is written in the bottom row and the distri-
bution of children is written in the extreme right-hand column22. As Prais (1955)
explains, since there are 59.6 fathers in the first class and 173.8 children in the
same class, it is assumed that the balance of 114.2 children, that has moved into
the first class, has a father in the second. In the second class there are 1879.2
fathers but only 1087.9 children thus we write 1047 in cell (2,2), the remaining
number of children comes from the other classes. This procedure is continued till
the final class is reached which balances out exactly, since the number of fathers
and children is equal in total.
22All observations are weighted using the weights given by the Bank of Italy
Chapter 1. Intergenerational Mobility. 32
The matrix R is than derived by dividing each column by the sum of the element
in it, and this matrix will satisfy the equation:
pit+1 = Rpit, (1.28)
R must be inverted to calculate Q. From Eq. 1.27 it follows that Q is given by
PR−1. Table 1.23 contains the values found for the matrix adjusted for shifts in
the occupational structure.
We use the same procedure for Cohorts II and III.
Tables 1.20, 1.21 and 1.22 display some negative transition probabilities. This
result is due to the hypothesis of minimal movement between classes but we can
not reject the null hypothesis of equality of these probabilities to zero at the usual
level of confidence of 5%23.
Table 1.20: Changes in the occupational structure, Cohort I.
UN BC SE&FB OAW OW&T MP M&M N.Obs.
UN 59.6 114.2 0 0 0 0 0 173.8
BC 0 1087.9 0 0 0 0 0 1087.9
SE&FB 0 147.7 53.8 0 0 0 0 201.5
OAW 0 0 0 376.7 0 0 0 376.7
OW&T 0 202.6 0 407.3 509.3 0 0 1119.2
MP 0 114.5 0 0 0 70.5 0 185.1
M&M 0 212.4 0 0 0 0 185.5 397.9
N.Obs. 59.6 1879.2 53.8 784 509.3 70.5 185.5 3542
Comparing the transition matrices reporting in Tables 1.23, 1.24 and 1.25 with
those in Tables 1.11, 1.12 and 1.13, we observe that for all Cohorts for the second
and fourth class the persistence increases and some of the transition probabilities
out of the main diagonal changed. In particular, in class BC, the probability of
children to worse their occupation with respect to their father’s one increases.
Table 1.26 shows mobility indexes calculated on the transition matrix adjusted for
the shifts in the occupational structure. The general impression is that the level of
mobility is lower then that observed in the Table 1.14. Furthermore, IB, IBM and
23In Atkinson (1980) there is a similar approach and he also obtains transition matrices con-
taining both positive and negative probabilities.
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IFL tend to increase while IS does not change a lot over the considered period.
This result suggests that the occupational mobility observed seem to be due to a
change in the occupational structure and not to the result of the forces making
for social mobility.
Table 1.21: Changes in the occupational structure, Cohort II.
UN BC SE&FB OAW OW&T MP M&M N.Obs.
UN 52.7 120.8 0 0 0 0 0 173.5
BC 0 1317.7 0 0 0 0 0 1317.7
SE&FB 0 91.5 76.1 0 0 0 0 167.6
OAW 0 0 0 379.4 0 0 0 379.4
OW&T 0 208.7 0 324.1 666.8 0 0 1199.6
MP 0 128.4 0 0 0 128.8 0 257.2
M&M 0 82.2 0 0 0 0 249.8 332
N.Obs. 52.7 1949.3 76.1 703.5 666.8 128.8 249.8 3827
Table 1.22: Changes in the occupational structure, Cohort III.
UN BC SE&FB OAW OW&T MP M&M N.Obs.
UN 42.8 33.5 0 0 0 0 0 76.3
BC 0 853.4 0 0 0 0 0 853.4
SE&FB 0 38.2 53.8 0 0 0 0 77.6
OAW 0 0 0 167.4 0 0 0 167.4
OW&T 0 35.9 0 226.4 405.9 0 0 668.2
MP 0 43 0 0 0 63.5 0 106.5
M&M 0 25.1 0 0 0 0 99.5 124.6
N.Obs. 42.8 1029.1 39.4 393.8 405.9 63.5 99.5 2074
Table 1.23: Social transition matrix adjusted for the shifts in the
occupational structure, Cohort I.
Children\Father UN BC SE&FB OAW OW&T MP M&M
UN 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.04
BC 0.33 0.65 0.09 0.28 0.15 0.04 0.04
SE&FB 0.02 0.03 0.22 0.18 0.03 0.04 0.03
OAW 0.14 0.10 0.07 0.33 0.05 0.12 0.05
OW&T 0.17 0.26 0.37 0.15 0.44 0.17 0.37
MP 0.05 −0.03 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.21 0.13
M&M 0.21 −0.08 0.18 −0.06 0.20 0.38 0.33
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Table 1.24: Social transition matrix adjusted for the shifts in the
occupational structure, Cohort II.
Children\Father UN BC SE&FB OAW OW&T MP M&M
UN 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02
BC 0.22 0.66 0.18 0.36 0.17 0.10 0.02
SE&FB 0.02 0.03 0.13 0.14 0.01 0.06 0.02
OAW 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.27 0.06 0.11 0.05
OW&T 0.41 0.17 0.31 0.15 0.49 0.19 0.44
MP 0.02 −0.03 0.02 0 0.11 0.34 0.12
M&M 0.1 0 0.06 0.02 0.11 0.17 0.31
Table 1.25: Social transition matrix adjusted for the shifts in the
occupational structure, Cohort III.
Children\Father UN BC SE&FB OAW OW&T MP M&M
UN 0.08 0.04 0 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.02
BC 0.42 0.65 0.09 0.28 0.15 0.04 0.04
SE&FB 0.01 0.01 0.14 0.19 0.02 0.02 0.02
OAW 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.40 0.04 0.03 0.10
OW&T 0.25 0.22 0.35 −0.15 0.52 0.42 0.45
MP 0.09 0.01 0.07 0 0.06 0.25 0.11
M&M 0.08 0 0.12 0 0.11 0.10 0.16
Table 1.26: Mobility indices for the three different Cohorts adjusting
for the shifts in the occupational structure.
Index\Cohort I (1947− 1956) II (1957− 1966) III (1967− 1976)
IS 0.78
(0)
0.78
(0)
0.79
(0)
IB 0.09
(0)
0.09
(0)
0.10
(0)
IBM 0.034
(0.002)
0.041
(0.002)
0.048
(0.004)
IFL 0.067
(0)
0.082
(0)
0.091
(0)
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis; they are computed via a bootstrap procedure with
300 bootstraps (see Efron and Tibshirani (1993))
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1.5 Intergenerational Mobility and Gender Dif-
ferences.
In this section we carry out an analysis about intergenerational mobility focusing
on the differences between sons and daughters both in terms of educational attain-
ment and of occupational status. As regards the parents, we still consider only
the father. We select sons and daughters, heads of household, aged from 34 to
6324. With reference to educational mobility the daughters’s sample is composed
by 4,117 observations, while the sample of sons is composed by 8,692 observations.
As regards occupational mobility, the former is composed by 2,739 observations,
whereas the latter contains 7,946 observations. As in Section 1.4, we consider the
three cohorts, defined by the year of birth of heads of household.
1.5.1 Educational Mobility.
Table 1.27 reports the distribution of daughters in each educational class for each
Cohort. As expected, the percentage of women that obtains an upper secondary
school and the university degree is increased over time while those with the com-
pulsory school is decreased.
According to the mobility indexes presented in Table 1.28, educational mobility
appears to decrease from Cohort I to Cohort III, in particular for the IS and IB.
IFL shows a different dynamics, that is, it increases from Cohort I to Cohort III
suggesting an increase of income mobility. Table 1.29 displays that mobility in-
dexes calculated for sons show the same trend. Comparing tables 1.29 and 1.28,
and in particular IS, we can conclude that the younger daughters show a higher
level of educational mobility than sons and this difference is statistically signifi-
cant as demonstrated by the p-value reported in Table 1.30. IFL suggests that for
24Those women that are head of household may be are in a particular family situation, for
example they are separated or divorced.
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Cohort I sons are more mobile than daughters, whereas for Cohorts II and III is
the opposite25.
Table 1.27: Education Distribution for Daughters.
Class\Cohort I (1947− 1956) II (1957− 1966) III (1967− 1976)
CS 0.55 0.40 0.34
USS 0.33 0.45 0.47
UD 0.12 0.14 0.19
Table 1.28: Daughters’s Mobility Indexes.
Index\Cohort I (1947− 1956) II (1957− 1966) III (1967− 1976)
IS 0.68
(0.04)
0.66
(0.03)
0.64
(0.03)
IB 0.13
(0.01)
0.10
(0.01)
0.09
(0.01)
IBM 0.07
(0.006)
0.05
(0.005)
0.05
(0.006)
IFL 0.23
(0.01)
0.28
(0.01)
0.29
(0.01)
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis; they are computed via a bootstrap procedure with
300 bootstraps (see Efron and Tibshirani (1993))
Table 1.29: Sons’ s Mobility Indexes.
Index\Cohort I (1947− 1956) II (1957− 1966) III (1967− 1976)
IS 0.69
(0.03)
0.67
(0.03)
0.57
(0.03)
IB 0.12
(0.01)
0.11
(0.01)
0.09
(0.01)
IBM 0.07
(0.004)
0.06
(0.004)
0.05
(0.005)
IFL 0.24
(0.005)
0.27
(0.005)
0.26
(0.005)
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis; they are computed via a bootstrap procedure with
300 bootstraps (see Efron and Tibshirani (1993))
Table 1.31 shows the ratio between the mobility indexes, computed on actual
transition matrices, and mobility indexes computed on perfect mobility transi-
tion matrices, both for daughters and sons. From this Table appears that female
mobility is nearest to the situation of Perfect Mobility than the male’s one. In
25The p-values guarantee that the indexes are statistically different at 10% and 5% level of
confidence.
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Table 1.30: P-values of Test of Equality between Mobility Indexes of
Daughters and Sons.
Index\Cohort I II III
IS 0.5 0.4 0.08
∗
IB 0.3 0.8 0.3
IBM 0.2 0.1 0.4
IFL 0.09
∗ 0.08∗ 0.03∗∗
particular, we observe that IB and IBM calculated for daughters are higher than
those calculated for sons and the differences are statistically significant.
Table 1.31: “Distance” from a Perfect Mobile Society for Daughters
and Sons.
Cohort I Cohort II Cohort III
Index Women Men Women Men Women Men
IS 0.68 0.69 0.66 0.67 0.64 0.57
∗
IB 0.66 0.63
∗ 0.69 0.65∗ 0.57 0.54∗
IBM 0.53 0.53 0.61 0.56
∗ 0.51 0.48∗
IFL 1.17 1.26 1.94 1.59 1.84 1.57
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1.5.2 Occupational Mobility.
Because of the historical importance of sex in determining an individual’s economic
outcomes, it is important to consider how sex affects intergenerational occupational
mobility. Women have historically faced barriers to economic success that have
prevented the prospects for upward economic mobility.
The intergenerational transmission of economic status has therefore likely been,
and potentially still is, different from parents to daughters and parents to sons.
If, for example, high-paying jobs are not available to women, then it would be
more difficult for a daughter than a son from a low-income family to achieve a
high-income job.
Table 1.32 reports the occupational distribution of women’s workers in each cohort.
Even in the most recent cohort, women are much more likely to be employed in
an office or as teachers. Furthermore, around 30% of women are employed as
blue-collar. It is likely that, even within occupations, men and women tend to
hold different jobs. Moreover, Goldin (1990) notes that women are forced to quit
certain jobs upon marriage. It is difficult to discern how much the remaining
differences reflects constraints and how much they reflect women’s choice26.
Table 1.32: Occupation Distribution for Daughters.
Class\Cohort I (1947− 1956) II (1957− 1966) III (1967− 1976)
UN 0.06 0.06 0.07
BC 0.25 0.27 0.32
SE&FB 0.06 0.05 0.04
OAW 0.04 0.03 0.03
OW&T 0.44 0.45 0.42
MP 0.07 0.06 0.06
M&M 0.08 0.07 0.05
Tables 1.33 and 1.34 report the mobility indexes for daughters and sons respec-
tively. Looking at IS and IFL, daughters seem to be more mobile than sons in each
Cohort, while looking at IB and IBM , seems there are no differences except for
26Any discussion of occupational or income mobility among women should be consider the role
of marriage in determining economic status and how that role has changed over time, but, in
this chapter I don’t treat it.
Chapter 1. Intergenerational Mobility. 39
the value of IB in the last Cohort (0.10 vs 0.11). In this case, indeed, daughters
appear less mobile than sons and the p-value, reported in Table 1.35, confirms
that indexes are statistically different at a 5% level of confidence, as well as IS and
IFL.
IS suggests a higher level of mobility for daughters than for sons because of the
higher persistence registered for some sons’s occupational classes: SE&FB, OAW,
MP and MM27.
Mobility indexes dynamics suggests that occupational mobility tends to decrease
with the exception of IS which, from Cohort I to Cohort III, slightly increases.
This results are in line with the previous findings which allow us to say that
intergenerational occupational mobility is decreased over time.
Table 1.33: Daughters’s Mobility Indexes.
Index\Cohort I (1947− 1956) II (1957− 1966) III (1967− 1976)
IS 0.86
(0.03)
0.87
(0.02)
0.87
(0.02)
IB 0.12
(0.01)
0.11
(0.006)
0.10
(0.006)
IBM 0.06
(0.006)
0.04
(0.004)
0.05
(0.005)
IFL 0.19
(0.01)
0.17
(0.007)
0.13
(0.006)
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis; they are computed via a bootstrap procedure with
300 bootstraps (see Efron and Tibshirani (1993))
Table 1.34: Sons’s Mobility Indexes.
Index\Cohort I (1947− 1956) II (1957− 1966) III (1967− 1976)
IS 0.84
(0.02)
0.81
(0.01)
0.83
(0.02)
IB 0.12
(0.004)
0.11
(0.003)
0.11
(0.004)
IBM 0.06
(0.003)
0.05
(0.002)
0.05
(0.005)
IFL 0.18
(0.004)
0.15
(0.004)
0.13
(0.005)
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis; they are computed via a bootstrap procedure with
300 bootstraps (see Efron and Tibshirani (1993))
27Transition matrices are in Appendix ??
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Table 1.35 reports p-values of the test of equality between daughters and sons’s
mobility indexes. From this table emerges that only few indexes result statistically
different most at 10% level of confidence.
Table 1.35: P-values of Test of Equality between Mobility Indexes of
Daughters and Sons.
Index\Cohort I II III
IS 0.3 0.02
∗∗ 0.1
IB 0.5 0.4 0.04
∗∗
IBM 0.2 0.3 0.07
∗
IFL 0.09
∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.4
Computing the ratio between mobility indexes in the two different situation, the
actual mobility process and the ergodic one, we notice that, as in the case of
educational mobility, daughters display a higher mobility than sons, in particular
according to IS. Both of groups show a decreased of occupational mobility over the
considered period, that is, an increase of the “distance” from the perfect mobility.
Table 1.36: “Distance” from a Perfect Mobile Society for Daughters
and Sons.
Cohort I Cohort II Cohort III
Index Women Men Women Men Women Men
IS 0.86 0.84 0.87 0.81 0.87 0.83
IB 0.76 0.68 0.74 0.66 0.66 0.68
IBM 0.67 0.61 0.51 0.55 0.63 0.57
IFL 1.20 1.02 1.14 0.89 0.86 0.81
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1.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter proposes an analysis of the degree of intergenerational mobility in
Italy over the period 1998-2010 using data from the Survey on Household Income
and Wealth. In particular, we study the level of mobility in terms of educational
attainment and occupational status using the approach based on the estimate of
Markov matrices. Mobility is, in fact, measured in terms of the probability of chil-
dren to better/worse their social status with respect to their fathers. In addition
to calculate transition matrices, we compute four synthetic indexes proposed by
Shorrocks (1978b) and Bartholomew (1973).
We divide the sample into three cohorts defined by the year of birth of heads of
household taking into account the structure of the society and the characteristics
of the labour market that are different in each of them.
The main findings are the following. The persistence in each educational classes
increased from the first to the last cohort and the probability to obtain a higher
educational attainment, compared to that of his father, is high for children with a
father with a compulsory school but it is low for those with a father more educated.
This finding is particularly puzzling since the changes in technology in favour of
more skilled workers and the reductions in the imperfections of capital market
would suggest that university degree should be more likely over time, independent
of the class of educational attainment of father. Furthermore, as suggested by
Checci et al. (1999), if one of the goals of a public education system is to favour
equal opportunities of social mobility, the Italian school system failed to achieve
this goal. Despite the public structure of education financing in Italy has ensured
a substantial uniformity of the quantity and quality of education, Italy displays
low intergenerational mobility in terms of educational levels. This result is con-
firmed by the dynamics of the synthetic indexes. In fact they tend to decrease over
the period. Moreover, the dynamics of the ratio between the indexes, computed
for the actual transition matrices, and those, computed for the perfect mobility
transition matrices, corroborates the reduction of educational mobility over the
considered period.
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As regards occupational mobility, Italy seems to be a less mobile society. We
observe an increased of the persistence of blue-collar, office workers and member
of profession classes suggesting a lower mobility of poor people, an increasing de-
mand of the jobs in public sector and an increase in the barriers to entry in many
professions. On the contrary, the entrepreneurial jobs show a decreased of the
persistence.
Occupational mobility therefore displays a downward trend, in the sense that
classes of occupations with low median income tend to increase their mass to the
detriment of the other classes. Over the considered period the mobility indexes
point out a reduction in mobility for the most recent cohorts.
Since occupational mobility can be due to both the results of the forces making for
social mobility and to other factors such as changes in the occupational structure,
we correct the transition matrices taking into account the shifts in the occupa-
tional structure following the approach introduced by Prais (1955). This analysis
shows that the level of mobility is lower than that suggested in Section 1.4.3.
In the main part of this chapter we study the level of intergenerational mobility
focusing only on the relationship between children and fathers without considering
the different influence of father’s educational and occupational characteristics on
sons and daughters. For this reason, the last section of this chapter is devoted to
the analysis of the gender gap in the intergenerational mobility.
The general impression, both for the educational attainment and for the occupa-
tion, is that daughters show a higher level of mobility than sons. This result is
confirmed by the ratios between mobility indexes that gives an idea of how the
registered level of mobility is far from the perfect mobility situation.
The question of whether important gender differences do exist in intergenerational
mobility of occupational status and educational attainment is still open and it is
worth more attention.
Chapter 2
Intragenerational Mobility in
Italy in 1987-2010
2.1 Introduction
Intragenerational mobility deals with the individual’s changes in social status
(measured by income, earnings or occupation) over the lifetime or the work car-
rier. This chapter focuses on income mobility which, as Fields (2006) discusses,
has various features and different implications in terms of social welfare.
In literature there is not consensus on a precise definition/concept of income mo-
bility but the fact that the relationship between actual and future income is an
essential ingredient of its measurement. Indeed several ways of summarizing this
relationship have been proposed.
Atkinson et al. (1992), Fields (2006), Fields and Ok (1996) contain a review of
income mobility concepts and of their measures. It can be distinguished between
mobility as: i) positional change, ii) income growth, iii) reduction of long-term
inequality and iv) income risk.
In this chapter, we refer to the concept of mobility as positional change (relative
mobility). The idea is that mobility depends on the relative variations of individ-
uals, that is, the definition of actual and future social conditions of an individual
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should consider the positions of everyone else in the society (Jenkins (2011)). Here,
therefore, mobility depends not on whether individual income has increased or de-
creased over time, but on how his/her social condition has changed with respect
to the average of (income) distribution. Thus, any equi-proportionate income neg-
ative variations of individual has not impact on mobility as positional change but
can has a negative impact in terms of income growth, a positive impact in terms
of reduction of long-term inequality, and a negative impact on mobility as income
risk.
Taken mobility as positional change, Perfect Mobility occurs when the future in-
come of each individual is independent of his/her actual income. In according
to this definition, there will be infinitely perfectly mobile society and, in particu-
lar, there will be a Perfectly Mobile Society with ex-post Minimum Inequality, as
we will discuss in Section 2.5, and a Feasible Perfectly Mobile Society where the
stochastic process reflects the equilibrium (ergodic) distribution (see Prais (1955)).
We focus in particular on the quantitative measurement of the intragenerational
income mobility in Italy.
We provide two novel methodologies to estimate income mobility based on non-
parametric methods, and we apply it to the analysis of mobility of a sample of
Italian individuals (between 16 and 65 years old) from the Survey on Household
Income and Wealth (SHIW) by the Bank of Italy in the period 1987-2010. To our
scope, individual disposable earnings (wage plus self-employment and business in-
come) with respect to the sample average appear the most appropriate measure
of relative income. In literature, on the assumption that the log of income follows
a linear Markovian model, the estimate of constant elasticity of (relative) income
between different periods is the usual measure of income mobility considered in
literature (see Atkinson et al. (1992)). However, we will show how is severely
biased both by the presence of serial correlation in error term, and overall by the
presence of nonlinearities. First, a linear specification of the Markovian model is
estimated removing the assumption of no serial correlation suggesting a low level
of income mobility; second, a nonlinear specification of Markovian model is esti-
mated, providing both a local and synthetic measures of income mobility.
Chapter 2. Intragenerational Mobility in Italy in 1987-2010 45
The local measure of income mobility consists in the estimate of the elasticity of
(relative) income at period t conditioned to the level of (relative) income at period
t − 1, (LIE), by estimating the stochastic kernel of income dynamics in a con-
tinuous state space and the related conditioned mean (Quah (1997)). Synthetic
measures of income mobility consist in indexes based on the estimate of stochas-
tic kernel and related ergodic distribution largely inspired by Shorrocks (1978a)
and Bartholomew (1973); at the same time they also provide a complementary
estimate of the “local” income mobility (LIMI), i.e. income mobility for different
ranges of income.
Income mobility reaches a minimum in the middle of income distribution and max-
imum values at the extreme bounds, with an income elasticity ranging from 0.4
to 0.8 in the relevant range of income (0.5-2). The estimate of local component
of the synthetic mobility indexes confirms these results. Overall income mobility
in Italy appears to be low with respect other developed countries (e.g. in U.S. is
estimated equal to about 0.4 in terms of income elasticity, see Altonji and Dunn
(1991)). We also analyse the different dynamics of income mobility into two sub-
periods: 1987-1998 and 2000-2010. Income mobility has increased over time, in
particular in the middle of distribution.
Finally, we investigate the relationship between income mobility and inequality.
Gini index of income distribution has strongly increased over time, suggesting that
the low income mobility could not offset the higher income inequality as suggested
by Shorrocks (1978a).
The chapter is outlined as follows. Section 2.2 provides a literature review of
intragenerational income mobility; Section 2.3 explains the methodology used to
estimate mobility measures. In Section 2.5 we discuss the concept of Perfect Mo-
bility and its welfare implications, while the empirical application is presented in
Section 2.6. The preliminary analysis of the relationship between income mobil-
ity and inequality is discussed in Section 2.7. Finally, Section 2.8 contains some
concluding remarks.
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2.2 A Literature Review
Several studies have examined income mobility over the past 20 years using a
variety of methods and longitudinal data sources1. These studies are very hetero-
geneous. They vary from one investigation to the next in, among other respects,
the period considered, the population studied and the accuracy of the incomes
data. The level of mobility is therefore measured in different ways and using dif-
ferent approaches.
The most straightforward measure to analyse income mobility is the coefficient of
correlation or the regression coefficient. A high value of these coefficients indicates
a low level on income mobility. The main studies concern the measurement of the
level of incomes mobility in Britain and US.
Thatcher (1976) makes a comparison of the correlation in the New earnings Survey
of weekly earnings in Britain with that of annual earnings obtained from DHSS
data distinguishing for the age of individuals. This comparison suggests a level of
correlation equals to 0.78 for the age group 30-39 leading to low level of mobility.
The correlation may vary from year to year. This may be due to sampling fluctu-
ations, and we should draw attention to the possible sensitivity of the correlation
coefficients to outlying values. This is discussed by Thatcher (1971).
Bourguignon and Morrison (1987) analyse the career profiles of a sample of work-
ers and employees in France by age groups. The sample collects series of annual
salaries received by workers, employees, supervisors and technicians over a period
of 28 years, from 1950 to 1977, and even over a period of 39 years for a sub-sample.
For the whole of the sample followed and on average, salary ”mobility” seems mod-
erate. It would be much greater if a small but privileged group were excluded:
employees of large companies salaried for life. On the other hand, mobility among
workers and employees remains significant even after age 40 or 45. Hause (1980)
provides an analysis on the structure of earnings profiles. He calculates the corre-
lation coefficients for white collar males in Sweden and he observes that it is equal
to 0.53 for younger people but it tends to increase by age.
1Longitudinal data contain information about a sample of individuals and families over a
period of time, which is collected from periodic surveys.
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Furthermore, Lillard and Willis (1978), using the PSID dataset, discuss on a dif-
ferent aspect of earnings mobility. They study mobility by deriving the probability
statements implied by the earnings function for arbitrary time sequences of earn-
ings states or for a group of individuals. They derives also the distribution of
poverty probabilities across observationally identical individuals. Their findings
indicate that there is a considerable tendency for individuals to retain their posi-
tion in the earnings distribution over time whether this position is in the lower,
upper or middle portions of the distributions.
A second way generally used to measure the degree of incomes (or earnings) mo-
bility refers to transition matrices. These have been constructed in a variety of
forms, in that the ranges may be defined in terms of:
• ranges of money earnings (see Hart (1976b), Hart (1976a), McCall (1973)
and Solow (1951)),
• quantile groups (see Bourguignon and Morrison (1987) and Royal Commis-
sion (1979))
The second is the most common method, but the width of the classes varies, so
that a given jump implies a smaller change in earnings in the middle of the dis-
tribution than at the tails. At the same time, it is impossible to move downwards
from the bottom quantile group or upward from the top group causes the diag-
onal elements to be over estimated and mobility under estimated (Hart (1983)).
Thatcher (1971) proposes an alternative approach consisting in defining income
ranges relative to the mean.
The information contained in transition matrices may be summarised by an indica-
tor like the immobility ratio. This index measures the percentage of people staying
in the same decile or entering the decile immediately above/below. Moreover, it
possible to calculate others synthetic indexes. Shorrocks (1978b), Bartholomew
(1996) and Fields and Ok (1996) provide a wide discussion on these indexes2. A
2We have to remember that the interpretation of these indexes depends on the width of the
ranges.
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limit of mobility indexes is that, like correlation coefficient, they are a single sum-
mary measures. More information from the transition matrix is presented when
the indexes are given for each quantile of origin (see Schiller (1977)).
Empirical studies of income mobility began with work on developed countries;
see Atkinson et al. (1992) and Gottschalk (1997) for summaries. The United
States, United Kingdom and Italy appears as the less mobile society with re-
spect to Scandinavian countries or Canada (see Jarvis and Jenkins (1998), Corak
et al. (2002), Aaberge et al. (2002), Boeri and Brandolini (2005) and Pisano and
Tedeschi (2008)). As panel data sets became available for developing countries,
further research was carried out in those parts of the world; see the special issue
of The Journal of Development Studies (vol.36, August 2000) and Fields (2001)
for summaries of mobility research in the developing world as of the turn of the
millennium.
2.3 The Methodology
This section discusses the methodological issues in the measurement of income
mobility.
Firstly we critically review the standard approach, and then we propose two new
methodologies based on non-parametric methods.
2.3.1 Standard Approach to the Measurement of Income
Mobility
In literature the standard (Markovian) model describing income dynamics of in-
dividual i at period t is given by:
wi,t = βwi,t−1 + ηi,t, (2.1)
where wit and wit−1 are the (logarithm of) relative income yit (normalized with
respect to sample average of period) (see Atkinson et al. (1992)). The following
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assumptions on the stochastic term ηit guarantee an unbiased estimate of the
coefficient β:
ηit ∼ N
(
− σ
2
η
2 (1 + β)
, σ2η
)
; (2.2)
cov (ηit, ηit+s) = 0 with s 6= 0; (2.3)
cov (ηit, ηjt) = 0 with j 6= i; and (2.4)
cov (wit−1, ηit) = 0. (2.5)
Assumption (2.2) implies an exogenous variability and independent of the income
level. The negative expected mean of the stochastic term derives from the con-
straints that E [ewit ] = E [yit] = 1.
Moreover, under Assumptions (2.2)-(2.5) and β ∈ (−1, 1) Central Limit Theorem
applies, i.e.:
wit ∼ N
(
− σ
2
η
2 (1− β2) ,
σ2η
1− β2
)
, (2.6)
and therefore
yit ∼ lnN
(
− σ
2
η
2 (1− β2) ,
σ2η
1− β2
)
. (2.7)
Assumptions (2.3) and (2.4) implies that the stochastic term is i.i.d over time and
across individuals. Assumption (2.5) implies that there is no any omitted variable.
In order to have a meaningful model of income dynamics β should be lower than
13.
From the estimate of the Markovian Model (2.1) the literature proposes two mea-
sures of income mobility (see Boeri and Brandolini (2005) and Pisano and Tedeschi
(2008)):
• βˆ: a high value of the estimated elasticity of current income to past income,
i.e. βˆ, implies a low level of income mobility;
3Indeed, from Eq. (2.1) wi,t = β
twi,0 +
∑t
j=0 β
jηi,t−j , hence, limt→∞ βtwi,0 = 0 for β ∈
(−1, 1), and given a sequence of random independently distributed variables, as t → ∞ proves
that the Central Limit Theorem is applicable to wi,t.
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• ρˆt,t−1 = βˆσˆw(t−1)/σˆw(t): a high value of the estimated serial correlation of wi
implies a low value of income mobility.
It is worth nothing that the correlation coefficient, ρˆ, is proportional to βˆ but it
is inversely related to the income variance.
The standard deviation of income, σw(t) is a measure of income inequality; this
suggests an inverse relationship between mobility and inequality: a higher value
of σw(t) (given σw(t−1)) means an increase of inequality but, also a decrease in ρˆ,
i.e. an increase in mobility.
2.3.1.1 Serial Correlation in the Error Term
The Markovian model in Eq. (2.1) is crucially based on the assumption that the
stochastic term is uncorrelated over time. However, individuals are able to move
through the income distribution in a quite systematic way, or incomes improve-
ments may depend crucially on previous success.
To evaluate the bias in the estimates due to the presence of serial correlation as-
sume that the stochastic term ηi,t in Eq. (2.1) follows the first-order auto-regressive
process:
ηit = φηit−1 + εit, (2.8)
where φ ∈ (−1, 1) is assumed to be the same for all individuals, and εit is i.i.d
with variance σ2ε . φ > 0 means that success breeds success, φ < 0 means that
success in one period tends to be followed by a reverse in the next.
If φ are serially correlated, the estimate of β in Eq. (2.1) by OLS is not consistent.
Given Eq. (2.8), the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure (see Creedy (1974)) allows to
adjust the estimate of linear model for the serial correlation; in particular the
model (2.1) is transformed into a model where OLS leads to unbiased estimate of
β. The first step is to take Eq. (2.1) at the period t− 1:
wit−1 = βwit−2 + ηit−1, (2.9)
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Multiplying Eq. (2.9) for φ and subtracting from Eq. (2.1), we obtain:
wit − φwit−1 = βwit−1 − φβwit−2 + εit, (2.10)
where ηit − φηit−1 = εit (see Eq. (2.8)). Eq. (2.10) can be written as:
wit = awit−1 − bwit−2 + εit, (2.11)
where a is equal to φ+ β and b is equal to φβ.
Eq. (2.11) can be consistently estimated by OLS. Given an estimate of a and b,
aˆ = φ+ β and bˆ = φβ, Creedy (1974) shows that β and φ are the positive roots of
the following equation:
x2 − ax+ b = 0 (2.12)
Applying this procedure to a sample 12,999 observations (the sample is limited by
the necessity to have three wave transitions, i.e. 4-years lag):
wit = 0.458
(0.008)
wit−1 − 0.235
(0.007)
wit−2 (2.13)
Given these estimates, β and φ are respectively equal to 0.76 and 0.30. The
estimate of Eq. (2.1) provided a value of βˆ equals to 0.57; the resulting bias is
therefore equal to of 0.19.
2.3.1.2 The Drawbacks of the Standard Methodology
The standard approach to measure income mobility presents two drawbacks.
First, the model involves that the log of relative incomes are normally distributed,
but this not hold in the Italian data. Figure (2.1) shows that the income data of
our sample in 1987 are not normally distributed. The blue curve represents the
confidence bands calculated by bootstraps under the null hypothesis of normally
distributed observations, while the black curve is the estimated distribution of the
log relative income in 1987. The estimate is largely outside the confidence bands
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for wide ranges of income and the Jarque-Bera test of the hypothesis of normal
distribution is rejected at 5% significance level.
Figure 2.1: The Distribution of the Log of Relative Income of Indi-
viduals in 1987. Source: SHIW.
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The second drawback is the implicit assumption that mobility is independent of
the level of (relative) income. Figure (2.2) reports the estimates both of the linear
model against the estimate of the nonlinear Markov model reported in Eq. (2.14)
below4.
Figure (2.2) highlights statistically significant difference between the estimate of
linear and nonlinear Markov model (see Section 2.6.2 for more details).
4Nonlinear model is estimated by the (mgcv) routine (see Wood (2011) for more details).
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Figure 2.2: The Estimate of Markov Models for the period 1987-
2010. Confidence bands at 5% significance levels for non-parametrics
estimate are reported by red dotted lines. Source: SHIW.
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2.3.2 A New Methodology based on the Stochastic Kernel
Given the drawbacks of the standard methodology, we consider the alternative
nonlinear Markov model:
wi,t = β (wi,t−1)wi,t−1 + ηi,t (2.14)
where β is assumed to be a function of the income level at period t−1. The estimate
of β (wi,t−1) should be still in the range [0,1) ∀t in order to maintain a meaningful
model of income dynamics. In fact, from Eq. (2.14) wi,t =
∏t
j=0 β (wi,j)wi,0 +∑t
j=0
∏j
q=0 β (wi,q) ηi,j. Therefore limt→∞
∏t
j=0 β (wi,j)wi,0 = 0 for β (wi,j) ∈
(−1, 1). Given the sequence of random dependently distributed variables, the
Bernstein’s conditions guarantees the applicability of the law of large numbers
(see Gnedenko (1978)), i.e. the first two moments of the distribution are finite.
However the Central Limit Theorem cannot be applied, i.e. the limiting distribu-
tion of wi is not normal in general. Therefore Eq. (2.14) allows for not normal
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equilibrium distribution of income.
The estimate of Eq. (2.14) is obtained by estimating the stochastic kernel in a
continuous state space and the related conditioned mean. The stochastic kernel is
the conditional distribution of wt given wt−15:
g (wt|wt−1) = fwt,wt−1 (wt, wt−1)
fwt−1 (wt−1)
(2.15)
The estimate of the conditioned mean leads to a nonparametric estimated of the
Markovian Model (2.14):
E [gˆ (wt|wt−1)] = βˆ (wit−1)wit−1. (2.16)
In the nonparametric estimation of the Markovian Model, the problem of serial
correlation can be easily settled. Bowman and Azzalini (1997) explain that the
additive nature of the kernel estimator makes the correlation between wi, wj ir-
relevant6. Therefore, the expectation of the kernel estimator is exactly the same
as for independent data. This result is common to other estimators, for instance
when the sample mean is used to estimate the population mean for dependent
data.
Our methodology provides two classes of measures of income mobility:
• Local Measures and
• Measures of Mobility by Synthetic Indexes.
5To estimate the stochastic kernel we follow the methodology proposed by Silverman (1986)
known as adaptive kernel. In appendix B.1 there is a brief description of this procedure.
6The general form of the kernel estimator is: fˆ(y) = 1n
∑n
i=1 ω(y − yi;h) where ω is itself a
probability density, called kernel function, whose variance is controlled by the parameter h.
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2.4 Mobility Measures
2.4.1 Local Indexes of Income Mobility
Model (2.14) admits that income mobility may change with the level of income;
the presence of non linearities suggests to use a local index of income mobility
defined as:
LIE =
dwit
dwit−1
= βˆ′ (wit−1)wit + βˆ (wit−1) , (2.17)
i.e. to use a measure of Local Income Elasticity (LIE).
The relationship between LIE and income crucially depends on the behaviour of β′.
If βˆ′′ is positive there will be always a positive relationship between LIE and wit; if
βˆ′′ is negative is instead a necessary condition to observe a negative relationship.
2.4.2 Synthetic Mobility Indexes
The second class of mobility indexes is represented by three indexes generally used
in literature to measure mobility. A higher value of these indexes means higher
income mobility.
The first index was inspired by Shorrocks (1978b). In general the Shorrocks index
with continuous state space appears as:
IS = 1−
∫ w¯
w
ω (q) g (q|q) dq; (2.18)
where ω (q) represents a weighting function that can assume different specifica-
tions7.
The closest counterpart to the original Shorrocks index in discrete state space is:
IUS = 1−
∫ w¯
w
U (q) g (q|q) dq; (2.19)
where U (q) is the uniform distribution. Using this distribution it implicitly as-
sumes that there are no differences between classes.
7See Schluter and Van de Gaer (2003).
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Alternatively ω (q) can be represented by the equilibrium distribution pi (q), that
is:
IES = 1−
∫ w¯
w
piw (q) g (q|q) dq; (2.20)
According to this specification, transition probabilities are measured in the long-
run. In our analysis we assume that the weighting function is equal to the marginal
density of the actual distribution. The Shorrocks index is the following:
IES = 1−
∫ w¯
w
fw (q) g (q|q) dq; (2.21)
IS is in the range [0, 1] and it measures the level of persistence since it considers
only the elements on the main diagonal (represented by g (q|q)).
Bartholomew (1973) proposed another index that takes into account the transi-
tion outside of the main diagonal, known as the Bartholomew index. It can be
computed as follow:
IαB =
∫ w¯
w
piw (q)
∫ w¯
w
g (s|q)ω (s, q, w, w¯, α) dsdq, (2.22)
where piw (q) is the ergodic distribution of w and ω (s, q, w, w¯, α) is a weighting
function. IαB is in [0, 1].
In particular the weighting function is :
ω (s, q, w, w¯, α) = |s− q|αA (w, w¯, α, q) (2.23)
where A (w, w¯, α, q) is a constant such that
∫ w¯
w
|s− q|αA (w, w¯, α, q) ds = 1. There-
fore, A (w, w¯, α, q) = 1∫ w¯
w |s−q|α
. If α, a parameter higher than zero, is equal to 2,
Bartholomew index weights the transition probabilities more than proportionally
with respect to the length of jumps between income levels.
Finally, we present a modified version of the Bartholomew index, known as Fiaschi-
Lavezzi index:
IFL =
∫ w¯
w
fw (q)
∫ w¯
w
g (s|q)w (s, q, w, w¯, α) dsdq (2.24)
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The use of the marginal distribution of w instead of the ergodic distribution re-
sponds to the fact that in income contexts the ergodic distribution could not
provide a faithful picture of the ultimate consequences of the current income dis-
tribution because intra-distribution patterns do not remain unchanged (Maza et al.
(2010)). Also this index varies between 0 and 1.
The last two indexes contain a Local Income Mobility Index (LIMI), i.e.:
LIMI =
∫ w¯
w
g (s|q)ω (s, q, w, w¯, α) ds (2.25)
This local mobility index should not be confused with the other local indexes since,
in this case, the transition probabilities are weighted.
2.5 Perfect Mobility and Welfare Implications
In Section 2.1 we have introduced the concept of Perfect Mobility. In general,
it occurs if future income of each individual is independent of his/her actual in-
come. According to this definition, there will be infinitely many possible mobility
processes, and so infinitely perfectly mobile society, but, following the approach
of Prais (1955), we choose the mobility process corresponding to the equilibrium
distribution (Feasible Perfect Mobile Society).
Perfect Mobility doesn’t imply ex-post Minimum Inequality, but it is one of the
possibility. In this case, if incomes are measured as ratio with respect to the sam-
ple average, a Perfect Mobile Society shows a global convergence to the sample
average (Social Optimum Perfect Mobility).
According to this definition, mobility is important not because income movements
are intrinsically valuable, but because it can help to attenuate the effects of dispar-
ities in initial endowments on future income prospects (Benabou and Ok (2001)).
From this view, mobility is considered as an equalizer of ex-ante opportunities
(but not necessarily of outcomes). Future realised income distributions can be
more unequal than the current one since, if this is due to shocks unpredictable
on the basis of initial conditions, there is little disparity of opportunity, that is,
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society appears fair.
The Perfect Mobility can be represented by the following transition matrix:
PE =

0 1 0
0 1 0
0 1 0
 (2.26)
where each row is equal to each other and the mobility process permits to reach
the average of the distribution.
In this context, measures of pure persistence and other mobility indexes (e.g. IS,
IB and IFL) are related to the notion of equalizer of opportunities but don’t directly
correspond to it. In particular, movements in relative incomes may be equalizing
or disequalizing, and mobility indexes, generally proposed in literature, fail to dis-
tinguish between the two. In evaluating mobility, in fact, it often considered that
the identity process (or identity matrix) should correspond to the smallest element
and be viewed as the worst scenario (see Shorrocks (1978b)). More generally, ac-
cording to this “diagonals view”, any increase in relative income movement (any
shifts from diagonal to off-diagonal elements) should imply a higher level of mo-
bility and a higher ranking the mobility ordering. Unfortunately, relative income
movements can be disequalizing as well equalizing, and only the latter type count
positively as mobility.
In this chapter we propose a method to overcome this drawback. To understand if
the existing mobility process is also equalizing we apply to mobility indexes, and
in particular to IB and IFL, a structure of weights which gives higher weights to
mobility towards sample average. The structure can be expressed as follow:
• if the actual income (s) is lower than the sample average (poor people) and
(s− q) < 0 ⇒ ωij = |s− q|α8;
• if the actual income (s) is lower than the sample average (poor people) and
(s− q) > 0 ⇒ ωij = − |s− q|α;
8q represents the future income state.
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• if the actual income (s) is higher than the sample average (reach people) and
(s− q) < 0 ⇒ ωij = − |s− q|α;
• if the actual income (s) is higher than the sample average (reach people) and
(s− q) > 0 ⇒ ωij = |s− q|α;
The Bartholomew index (IB) shows another limit. Supposing that the mobility
process is described by matrix 2.26, in this case IB, weighting transition probabili-
ties with the ergodic distribution, is equal to 0 suggesting that there is no mobility
because all the mass is concentrated on the central class. However, following the
notion of mobility as equalizer of opportunities, the matrix 2.26 represents a so-
ciety with Perfect Mobility and ex-post Minimum Inequality. Thus IB leads to a
wrong conclusion. This drawback can be solved using the uniform or the actual
distribution to weights the transition probabilities instead of the ergodic one.
2.6 The Empirical Application
2.6.1 The Data
Data used in the analysis are drawn from the historical database of the Bank of
Italy: “Survey on Household Income and Wealth” (SHIW). We study the changes
in the individual relative income in the period 1987-2010. In this period we have
12 waves (1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010).
We consider all individuals that remain in the sample at least for two consecutive
waves, male and females, aged from 16 up to 65 with positive income, obtaining a
sample of 13,090 individuals.
The variable used in the analysis is the logarithm of relative income of each indi-
vidual, defined as the ratio between the individual income and the sample average
of the distribution. In particular we consider the net income including income
both from wages and self-employment/business9.
9SHIW income code: YL (wage) and YM (self-employment/business income).
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The transitions are defined as the movements between two consecutive waves, i.e.
we consider 2-years lag. Given this lag we have 25,858 transitions10.
Table 2.1 reports descriptive statistics about the number of observations, the mean,
the median of the individual income and the Gini index, both for our individual
sample and for the total sample provided by the Bank of Italy (values in brackets).
There are no relevant differences between the two samples.
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Year N.Obs Mean Median Gini
1987 1, 010
(9,034)
17, 068
(18,180)
15, 406
(16,160)
0.27
(0.30)
1989 2, 503
(9,249)
18, 278
(18,282)
17, 332
(16,408)
0.23
(0.26)
1991 3, 309
(6,670)
17, 490
(16,851)
17, 056
(16,203)
0.20
(0.21)
1993 3, 818
(7,985)
17, 565
(16,946)
15, 994
(15,528)
0.30
(0.31)
1995 3, 555
(8,085)
16, 666
(15,844)
15, 600
(14,181)
0.32
(0.32)
1998 3, 911
(7,276)
17, 221
(16,998)
15, 815
(15,816)
0.31
(0.32)
2000 3, 918
(7,845)
17, 740
(17,390)
15, 813
(15,813)
0.29
(0.30)
2002 3, 704
(7,397)
18, 087
(17,944)
16, 303
(15,604)
0.31
(0.32)
2004 3, 763
(7,265)
19, 379
(19,145)
16, 716
(16,270)
0.32
(0.34)
2006 3, 879
(7,077)
20, 237
(19,875)
17, 188
(16,651)
0.32
(0.33)
2008 4, 149
(7,048)
18, 770
(18,304)
16, 574
(16,369)
0.28
(0.29)
2010 2, 834
(6,847)
18, 215
(18,085)
16, 380
(16,500)
0.28
(0.30)
10Each sample unit is assigned a weight to take into account the probability of inclusion in
the sample and, only for the panel section of the survey, the correction for the attrition. The
variable used is “PESOFL2”, obtained by multiplying PESOFL. Weights obtained by raking
for alignment with the distributions derived from socio-demographic and labor force statistics
from ISTAT by a constant (different for each survey) providing the estimate of the totals for the
universe (Italian resident population).
In the analysis we use the historical database that includes sampling weights slightly different
from those of the annual waves.
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2.6.2 Income Mobility during 1987-2010.
Figure 2.3 reports the estimate of the stochastic kernel for the relative incomes of
Italian individuals during the period 1987-2010.
The red line represents the unbiased estimate of linear model, while the black
curve is the conditional mean, i.e. the expected income at wave t conditional to
income of wave t− 111. This stochastic process governing the income distribution
appears to be strongly non linear but with just one equilibrium in 1. Indeed the
black curve crosses the bisector from below in one point, around 1, leading to an
actual and equilibrium (ergodic) distribution with one peak. The fact that the
average, both for high and low level of income at time t − 1, is far above the
bisector suggests that there is convergence towards the mean value of income in
the considered period.
The vertical line represents the situation with Perfect Mobility and ex-post Min-
imum Inequality. The horizontal distance between this line and the estimate of
the stochastic kernel shows that we are far from a Perfect Mobility situation, in
particular at the extremes of the distribution.
To compare our analysis with others studies, we estimate the linear model. The
estimate of the elasticity reported in Table 2.2 shows that there is a low level of
income mobility. This finding is confirmed by ρˆ.
Pisano and Tedeschi (2008) corroborate this result. They measure the level of
earnings mobility using ρˆ for two periods finding that, for the first period (1995-
1998), ρˆ is equal to 0.47, whereas, for the second one (2004-2006), it is equal to
0.60 suggesting a decrease of income mobility.
Moreover, Table 2.2 highlights that the assumption of no serial correlation in error
term leads to an overestimate of mobility of mobility. In fact, removing it, βˆ and
ρˆ increase showing a lower level of income mobility.
The Figure 2.4 reports the biased and unbiased estimate of the linear model and
the estimate of the Local Income Elasticity for the period 1987-2010. The Figure
11The estimate of confidence bands for the conditional mean is made by the bootstrap proce-
dure (1,000 replications) with 5,000 transitions randomly drawn from the original sample (this
is for the huge computational burden) (see Efron and Tibshirani (1993)).
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Figure 2.3: Estimated Stochastic Kernel of Relative Income for the
period 1987-2010. Confidence bands at 5% significance levels for non-
parametrics estimate are reported by black dashed lines.
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Table 2.2: Estimates of the Elasticity and Correlation Coefficient for
the period 1987-2010.
Indexes 1987− 2010
βˆbiased 0.567
(0.005)
ρˆbiased 0.597
(0.006)
βˆunbiased 0.766
(0.008)
ρˆunbiased 0.626
(0.007)
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis
2.4 shows that observations in the range [0.61-1] displays a lower level of mobility
than those in the tails of the distribution.
Table 2.3 reports the value of synthetic mobility indexes described in Section 2.4.
IS is close to 1 while the other indexes are lower. However, the low value of the
last three indexes doesn’t means that the society is far to be Perfectly Mobile, in
the sense described by Prais (1955). To establish whether or not the society shows
Chapter 2. Intragenerational Mobility in Italy in 1987-2010 63
Figure 2.4: Local Income Elasticity for the period 1987-2010. Confi-
dence bands at 5% significance levels for the estimates are reported
by red dashed lines
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Perfect Mobility we use the same method described in Chapter 1.
First we compute the mobility indexes on the perfect mobility transition matrix
Table 2.3: Synthetic Mobility Indexes for the period 1987-2010.
Index\Period 1987− 2010
IS 0.958
(0.0009)
IB(α = 1) 0.267
(0.0012)
IB(α = 2) 0.248
(0.0014)
IFL 0.266
(0.011)
Num.Obs 25858
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis
(where each row is equal to each other and to the ergodic distribution) and then
we compare them with mobility indexes calculated on the actual transition matrix.
Table 2.4 reports the ratio between the two types of mobility indexes. With the
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exception of IS, the level of income mobility measured is about 0.40% of a Perfect
Mobile Society.
Table 2.4: “Distance” from a Perfect Mobile Society for the period
1987-2010.
Index\Period 1987− 2010
IS 0.96
IB 0.38
IBM 0.38
IFL 0.35
The magnitude of the last three indexes is important, but we are interesting also
into evaluate the level of mobility along the distribution using their local compo-
nent. Figure 2.5 shows that, at low income level, mobility is low, then it starts
to increase as income increases and, after a threshold, mobility comes back to
decrease. Looking at the dynamics of the indexes’s local component, those indi-
viduals that are in the middle part of the distribution display a higher level of
mobility than those that are at the extremes of the distribution.
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Figure 2.5: Local Income Mobility Index for the period 1987-2010.
Confidence bands at 5% significance levels for the estimates are re-
ported by red dashed lines.
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
Relative income (Log scale)
Lo
ca
l B
ar
th
ol
om
ew
 in
de
x
0.14 0.22 0.37 0.61 1 1.65 2.72
(a) Bartholomew Index (α = 1)
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(b) Bartholomew Index (α = 2)
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(c) Fiaschi-Lavezzi Index
2.6.3 Income Mobility during the periods 1987-1998 and
2000-2010.
To control the dynamics both of the stochastic kernel and of the mobility indexes
we divide the whole period into two sub-periods: 1987-1998 and 2000-2010. Figure
2.6 shows the estimate of the stochastic kernel in the sub-periods. In the second
period the richest part of the distribution shows a higher level of mobility than
in the first, they seem to be more close to the perfect mobility situation. The
opposite occurs for the poorest part of the distribution. However, these changes
are just slight. For the middle class, the level of mobility doesn’t change.
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Looking at the estimates of the local income elasticities for both periods, the Fig-
ure 2.7 shows a shift downwards and to the left.
Figure 2.6: Estimated Stochastic Kernel of Relative Income for the
two periods. Confidence bands at 5% significance levels for non-
parametrics estimates are reported by black and red dashed lines.
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Therefore, from the first to the second period, mobility decreases for the the poor-
est individuals (with relative income in the range [0.14-0.61]), increases for the
middle class (with relative income in the range [0.61-1.65]), and doesn’t change
for the richest individuals (with relative income higher than 1.65)12.
Table 2.5 reports the estimate of two classes of mobility indexes for both periods.
The Table displays that the unbiased estimate of β and ρ decreases over time
suggesting an increase in income mobility13. The estimate of the synthetic indexes
proves the same result. Indeed IB and IBM slightly increase showing a rise in
the income mobility, while IS and IFL doesn’t change. From a statistical point of
view, IB and IBM are statistically different
14.
12The statistical significance is tested by the bootstrap procedure.
13We can reject the null hypothesis of equality for the two indexes at the usual confidence level
of 5%.
14We can reject the null hypothesis of equality at the usual confidence level of 5%.
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Figure 2.7: Local Income Elasticity for the two periods. Confidence
bands at 5% significance levels for the estimates are reported by black
and red dashed lines
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The Table 2.6 highlights that, from the first period to the second one, the “dis-
tance” from a Perfect Mobile Society decreases.
Table 2.5: Synthetic Mobility Indexes for the two periods.
Index\Periods 1987− 1998 2000− 2010
βˆunbiased 0.81
(0.008)
0.75
(0.006)
∗
ρˆunbiased 0.77
(0.009)
0.71
(0.007)
∗
IS 0.96
(0.007)
0.96
(0.0006)
IB(α = 1) 0.25
(0.009)
0.26
(0.010)
∗
IB(α = 2) 0.23
(0.001)
0.24
(0.012)
∗
IFL 0.26
(0.009)
0.26
(0.009)
Num.Obs 9,624 13,472
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis
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Table 2.6: “Distance” from a Perfect Mobile Society for the two
periods.
Index\Period 1987− 1998 2000− 2010
IS 0.97 0.97
IB 0.36 0.38
∗
IBM 0.33 0.34
∗
IFL 0.37 0.37
Finally, Figure 2.8 reports the local component of IB computed for the two periods.
Individuals with a relative income in the range [0.35-0.65] show a decrease of
mobility, whereas those individuals in the range [0.65-1.5] display an increase of
mobility, as suggested by the Figure 2.7.
Figure 2.8: Local Income Mobility Index for the two periods. Confi-
dence bands at 5% significance levels for the estimates are reported
by black and red dashed lines.
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2.7 Income Mobility and Income Inequality
One of the primary motivations for economic mobility studies is to measure the
extent to which longer-term incomes are distributed more or less equally than in-
comes in a single year. Shorrocks (1978a) has emphasised: “mobility is regarded
as the degree to which equalization occurs as the period is extended. This view
captures the prime importance of mobility for economists.” If we observe high
income mobility, the degree of inequality in any given year would be unimportant,
because the distribution of lifetime income would be very even. In contrast, a so-
ciety with a rigid income distribution where everybody stays in the same position
year after year is commonly regarded as inferior to a more mobile society. An
increase in income mobility tends to reduce inequality in lifetime income relative
to that in a single period and is an indication that the economy is performing
better. Similarly, the recent rise in income inequality would be of no importance
if it had been accompanied with a rise in mobility.
Brandolini (2008) points out that, in the last two decades, Italy has gone through
an increase of income inequality, concentrated during the severe economic reces-
sion of the early 1990s.
In this chapter, we want to propose a preliminary analysis of the relationship be-
tween income inequality and income mobility. In particular we want to verify is
inequality is offset by mobility. In order to reach this aim, we calculate the Gini
index for the two sub-periods and we compare it with IB
15.
Table 2.7 shows that, over the considered period, the Gini index increases sug-
gesting an increase in income inequality but, on the other hand, IB increases only
slightly16. Thus, the high level of income inequality is not offset by an increase of
income mobility. This fact makes more difficult to accept the level of inequality.
15The Gini index is the mean distance of each income from all other incomes, expressed as
the proportion of the mean; it ranges from zero (perfect equality) to one (maximum inequality)
(Boeri and Brandolini (2005))
16The inequality of disposable income in Italy is among the highest in the European Union, as
shown by the most recent comparable statistics of the Luxembourg Income Study (2004) (Boeri
and Brandolini (2005)).
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Table 2.7: Bartholomew and Gini Index for the Relative Income.
Index\Years 1987− 1998 2000− 2010
IB 0.25
(0.009)
0.26
(0.010)
∗
IGini 0.33
(0.0023)
0.41
(0.0026)
∗
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis
Shorrocks (1978a) proposes a different approach to analyze the link between mo-
bility and inequality. Since he considers income mobility as a source of equalisation
of longer term income inequality as the observation period is lengthened, mobility
is seen as the opposite of rigidity (stability).
For the case of T annual observations on income, the rigidity index compares
the inequality of the mean income with the inequality of single-period incomes.
Shorrockss rigidity index has in the numerator the inequality of T-period cumu-
lated mean income, and in the denominator a weighted average of the inequality
in each year, with the weights being the ratio of the mean income in that year to
the mean income over T years. Shorrockss mobility index is then obtained as 1
minus the rigidity index. In this context the mobility index is dependent on which
underlying measure of income inequality is used. Different measures of income
inequality weight the income distributions differently.
2.8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have studied intragenerational income mobility of a sample of
italians individuals during the period 1987-2010. First of all, we have found that,
making the strong assumption of no serial correlation in error term, the linear
Markovian model provides a biased estimate of the level of mobility. In particular,
it leads to an overestimate.
Secondly, we have proposed two new methodologies to study income mobility be-
cause of the presence of strong nonlinearities in the estimates. We have introduced
two different types of mobility measures based on the estimate of the nonlinear
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Markovian model: a local measure given by the estimate of Local Income Elasticity
(LIE) and measures given by the estimate of synthetic mobility indexes.
The local mobility measure provides an estimate of the income mobility for each
level of income. It is obtained by estimating the stochastic kernel in a continuous
state space and the related conditioned mean.
The second type of mobility measures consist in three synthetic indexes (IS, IB
and IFL) that are computed starting from the estimate of the stochastic kernel and
that allow to measure income mobility at aggregate level. The last two synthetic
indexes contain a local measure of income mobility (LIMI).
The analysis shows that Italian individuals are characterized by a low level of in-
tragenerational mobility with respect to other countries (for example in U.S.A. βˆ
is around 0.4), and that the income mobility is very high at the extreme bounds of
distribution, but low in the middle. Moreover, income mobility is increased over
time only for the middle part of the distribution.
In this chapter we have also presented a very preliminary analysis of the relation-
ship between income inequality and income mobility since mobility is considered
as a valid instrument to offset the level of inequality. We have studied the dynam-
ics of a mobility and inequality index, (IB) and the Gini index respectively. The
result displays that the observed increase in income inequality in 1987-2010 is not
balanced by any increase in income mobility.
Chapter 3
Classical and Non Classical
Measurement Errors
3.1 Introduction
Econometricians have understood the problem of measurement error in survey
data for many years. Aigner et al. (1984) and Fuller (1987) provide excellent sur-
veys of the current literature. Incorrect responses to a survey question can bias
even simple estimation.
Thinking about income data, respondents may simply forget that they receive in-
come from a particular source, or misremember amounts conditional on receipt,
whether in a random way or by rounding exact amounts. Individuals may confuse
one income source with another. Measurement error may also be survey-produced,
as for example with the use of imputations for missing data, or faulty transcription
of data within the interviews process.
Meausrement error in income is generally considered to introduce bias in estimates
of income inequality, poverty and mobility. Researchers have faced the problem of
measurement error in several ways: some note the concern and proceed to use the
data despite it. A second current uses administrative records rather than survey
reports. This approach has dominated, for example, the research on earning mobile
72
Chapter 3. Classical and Non Classical Measurement Errors 73
in France, in which a whole series of studies have been conducted using adminis-
trative data; see for example, Bigard, Guillotin and Lucifora (1998), Buchinsky,
Fougre and Kramarz (1998). A third approach, found in the U.S. literature, is
to measure the differences between results obtained using survey data compared
with those using administrative records. These studies are known as ”validation
studies” and many of them confirms the presence of measurement error.
It is commonly suppose that measurement error in income is ’classical’. That is, it
is assumed that error in a given variable is uncorrelated with the true level of that
and all other variables in the model and the stochastic disturbance (Bound et al.
(1994)). Sometimes these assumptions can be justified but, in most micro data
analyses of labor market, they ca not be applied. For this reason, it can be useful
to investigate the importance and the impact of different types of measurement
errors.
If measurement error is not strongly correlated with earnings, recorded earnings
is more variable than actual earnings causing calculated mobility and inequality
measures to tend to overstate true mobility and inequality but, there is evidence
that measurement error in earnings is not classical, in particular it is mean revert-
ing, with low-earnings (high-earnings) individuals overstating (understating) their
earnings (Gottschalk and Huynh (2006)).
The non classical measurement error tends to offset the upward bias on inequality
caused by classical measurement error while the impact on mobility is less clear.
Mobility is indeed based on the joint distribution of reported earnings in two pe-
riods which implies that earnings and lagged earnings suffer from the same type
of measurement error and moreover that measurement errors in two period are
correlated.
In this chapter, following Gottschalk and Huynh (2006), we gauge the effect of
measurement error in survey-based earnings on mobility and inequality estimates
for Italy. We compare the estimates of micro mobility1 and inequality obtained
using earnings reported by respondents in household survey with the estimates ob-
tained using an administrative records. We use the Survey on Household Income
1The term micro mobility indicates the individual mobility within the income distribution.
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and Wealth (SHIW) data set, that contains individually reported net annual labor
earnings, linked to the data collected by Revelli’s Laboratory, Work Histories Ital-
ian Panel (WHIP). The latter data set is based on INPS administrative archives.
We treat the WHIP earnings as the “true” earnings.2.
The goal of this chapter is to investigate how much the estimates of mobility and
inequality are affected by measurement errors and if this errors is classical or not.
The chapter is organized as follows: we discuss the existing research on earnings
model and earnings measurement error in Section 3.2. The model used in the
analysis is described in Section 3.3. The data and the results are presented in
Section 3.4. Finally, Section 3.5 contains some concluding remarks.
3.2 A Literature Review
The equation which models earnings as a log linear function of individual and
job-related characteristics is one of most commonly used tools in the labor econ-
omy (see Becker (1975) and Mincer (1974)). Many researchers has focused on
estimating the returns to measurable human capital characteristics, such as years
of formal education or training, others analyze the union wage effect and the la-
bor market discrimination using the earnings equation. Finally, it can be used to
measure the level of earning inequality and mobility.
In the earnings equation, the residuals are interpreted as arising from unobserv-
able variables, such as the ability of the worker or his lucky in the labor market.
Measurement error in earnings, however, may also play a role. Researchers who
consider the presence of measurement error typically assume that is “classical” in
form. This requires that measurement error be normally distributed with mean
zero and constant variance, uncorrelated with true earnings and the values of
2In general, in literature, researchers consider the administrative earnings as the true data,
for example Duncan and Hill (1985) and Bound et al. (1994) compare employee and employer
earnings reports from a large manufacturing company and treat the employer reports as the
truth. Bound and Krueger (1991) compare CPS earnings report to SSA record and treat the
SSA data as the truth. In contrast Abowd and Stinson (2011) start their work with an agnostic
view about which data source is true, believing that there are legitime differences between survey
and administrative reports.
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explanatory variables, and uncorrelated over time for a given individual. Under
these assumptions, the estimation problems caused by measurement error in linear
model are limited: classical measurement error in an independent variable biases
all estimated coefficients toward zero. This type of error in the dependent vari-
able increases the model’s variance and standard errors but not affects parameter
estimates or associated statistic tests.
Several studies using validating data, however, suggest that the assumption of
classical measurement error in earnings data is inappropriate. The main sources
of validated labor market data are data set that contain personnel records on a
wide variety of employment information, including earnings, hours, fringe bene-
fits, unemployment spells and employment tenure. In US, the most used are the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics Validation Study (PSIDVS), used for example
by Bound et al. (1994), and the 1978 Current Population Survey-Social Security
Earnings Records Exact Match File, used for example by Bound and Krueger
(1991).
By assuming that employer records are error-free measures of the variables of in-
terest, researchers can use these data sets to test the properties of errors in survey
responses: Duncan and Hill (1985), Bound and Krueger (1991), Pischke (1995)
and Bollinger (1998) test these properties. In general, they find that measurement
error in earnings is negatively correlated with true earnings (i.e. mean reverting)
and positively autocorrelated over time. In particular, Duncan and Hill (1985)
find that the respondents to the PSID questionnaire has higher mean earnings
and lower variance of earnings than a nationally representative sample workers.
Furthermore they find that the variance of measurement errors is large. This find-
ing and the mean reverting measurement error are corroborated by Bound et al.
(1994). Abowd and Stinson (2011) apply a different approach which allows for
measurement error in earnings from administrative records as well as reported
earnings. Their goal is to first state the differences between the two data set and
then consider the reason of these differences.
More empirical studies, related to mine, are represented by Pischke (1995), Gottschalk
and Huynh (2006) and Dragoset and Fields (2006). They provide an estimate of
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the impact of measurement error on specific measures of mobility. Pischke (1995)
examines the structure of measurement error in the PSID earnings in relation to
the dynamics of the true earnings process. He characterizes the data using a model
in which individuals underreport the transitory component of earnings. This part
of measurement error implies that the transitory component will be underesti-
mated in a model of earnings dynamics.
Dragoset and Fields (2006) analyse the effect of measurement error on different
mobility measures while Gottschalk and Huynh (2006) develop a general frame-
work that can be used to examine the impact of non classical measurement error
on specifics inequality and mobility measures.
3.3 Measurement Error Model
The majority of studies has focused only on the implications of measurement error
when earnings appear as the dependent variable or as independent but not both.
Since we want to study the earnings dynamics, we assume earnings appear both
as the dependent and independent variable.
Assume the data generating process for earnings is a linear function:
y˜∗ti = βy˜
∗
it−1 + ε, (3.1)
where y˜∗i and y˜
∗
i−1 are the log relative earnings and the lagged log relative earnings
of household i at time t and t − 1 and we will maintain the assumption that ε is
uncorrelated with y˜∗i−1 with zero mean and σε as in Bound and Mathiowitz (2001)
3.
Replacing for y˜ its definition and solving we obtain the following model:
y∗ti = α + βy
∗
it−1 + ε, (3.2)
3Bound and Mathiowitz (2001) explain that the motivation of this assumption is strategic.
They are interested in the impact that measurement error has on the estimates and so focus on
the case where the estimates would be unbiased in its absence.
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where y∗ti and y
∗
it−1 are log earnings and lagged log earnings of household i at time
t and t−1 respectively4. α is the constant and β can be interpreted as an elasticity
of earnings.
The measures of inequality and mobility can be defined respectively as follow:
σ2y∗ti and σ
2
y∗it−1
represent a measure of inequality while βˆ and ρ = β
σy∗t−1
σy∗t
are mea-
sures of mobility.
Suppose that y∗ti and y
∗
it−1 are observed with errors, instead of y
∗
ti and y
∗
it−1 we
observe:
yti = y
∗
ti + υ (3.3)
and
yit−1 = y∗it−1 + µ, (3.4)
where υ and µ are measurement errors with zero mean and συ and σµ standard
deviation5.
The impact of measurement error on earnings inequality is given by:
σ2y − σ2y∗ = 2σy∗υ + σ2υ (3.5)
where σ2y and σ
2
y∗ are the variance of measured log earnings with and without mea-
surement error respectively, while σ2υ is the variance of measurement error. If σ
2
υ is
large and σy∗υ is zero, inequality appears upward biased, but if the measurement
error is mean reverse, σy∗υ < 0, the effect of the large variance can be offset by
the covariance and the inequality decreases.
As regards the measure of mobility, Gottschalk and Huynh (2006) derive the im-
pact of measurement error on the estimated elasticity from the following model:
yti = α + βyit−1 + υ − βµ+ ε (3.6)
resulting from Eq.(3.2)-(3.4). They show that the OLS estimate of β is given by:
4Appendix B.2 shows the derivation of the model 3.2
5Measurement error can occur for a number of reasons that are worth keeping distinct. Re-
spondents can simply misreport on a measure because, for example, their memory flawed.
Chapter 3. Classical and Non Classical Measurement Errors 78
β̂ =
σyt−1y
σ2yt−1
= β +
σyt−1υ
σ2yt−1
− βσyt−1µ
σ2yt−1
+
σyt−1ε
σ2yt−1
(3.7)
Rewriting Eq. (3.7) in terms of the parameters that underly the non classical
measurement errors, we obtain:
β̂ = β
(
1− σ
2
µ
σ2yt−1
)
+β
[
(
συy∗
σ2y∗
− σµy
∗
t−1
σ2y∗t−1
)
σ2y∗t−1
σ2yt−1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I BIAS
+
(
συy∗
σ2y∗
− συε
σ2ε
)
σ2ε
βσ2yt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
II BIAS
+
(
σεµ
σ2µ
+
συµ
σ2µ
)
σ2µ
σ2yt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
III BIAS
(3.8)
The Eq. (3.8) shows that the effects of non classical measurement error on βˆ are
represented by the three bias6.
The effect of mean reversion is represented by the first bias. Suppose that συy∗/σ
2
y∗
and σµy∗t−1/σ
2
y∗t−1
are negative, the net effect of mean reversion depends on offsetting
effects of mean reversion in earnings and lagged earnings. If there is equal mean
reversion in earnings and lagged earnings then συy∗/σ
2
y∗ and σµy∗t−1/σ
2
y∗t−1
are equal
and the term in braces is zero. In this case mean reversion does not affect mobility
as measured by β̂7.
The second bias shows that the mean reversion in υ could be different depending
on whether the variation in log earnings is a result of variation in y∗t−1 or because
of variation in ε8.
Finally, the last bias shows that the standard attenuation bias, captured by
β(σ2µ/σ
2
yt−1) may be partially offset by positive covariance between υ and µ or
between ε and µ. The former would happen if measurement error in earnings and
lagged earnings were positively correlated, βεµ > 0. In terms of my application to
earnings mobility, people who overstate their earnings in one period may tend to
overstate their earnings in the other period.
6The derivation of Eq.(3.8) is in Appendix B of Gottschalk and Huynh (2006).
7I have equal men reversion if earnings and lagged earnings are obtained from the same survey
instrument, administered in two different years.
8Recall that y∗ = βy∗t−1 + ε. Log earnings can vary either because of variation in βy
∗
t−1 or
because of variation in ε which represents unexpected shocks in earnings
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These results can be applied both to the estimates of elasticity and to the corre-
lation in earnings since ρˆ = β(σyt−1/σy). Thus, non-classical measurement error
affects the correlation coefficient through the ratio of the standard deviations, thus
even if non-classical measurement error has a large impact on estimates of σy and
σyt−1 this may have little effect on their ratio.
3.3.1 Classical Measurement Errors
Assume that the hypothesis of classical measurement error is correct, the last three
term of Eq. (3.8) are equal to zero and βˆ is given by:
βˆ = β
(
1− σ
2
µ
σ2yt−1
)
, (3.9)
which reduces to the standard result:
βˆ = β
(
σ2y∗t−1
σ2yt−1
)
< β (3.10)
since σ2yt−1 > σ
2
y∗t−1
and
ρˆ = ρ
σy∗t−1σy∗
σyt−1σy
< ρ. (3.11)
Classical measurement error, therefore, increases mobility as well as inequality.
Before proceeding, it is useful to highlight a few results that can be derived from the
general approach for the biases due to measurement errors when the assumption
of classical measurement error holds.
Bound and Mathiowitz (2001) assume the true model is
y∗ = βx∗ + ε (3.12)
Instead of x∗ and y∗, they observe x and y, where:
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x = x∗ + µ (3.13)
and
y = y∗ + υ (3.14)
To simplify the discussion, they assume βyx ≥ 0. They consider three special cases.
First, if there is classical measurement error in only one independent variable, the
proportional bias in estimating β depends on the noise to total variance ratio,
σ2µ/σ
2
x. In particular, with only one independent variable in the regression, the
proportional bias is just:
βyx = β[1−
σ2µ
σ2µ + σ
2
x∗
] (3.15)
Thus, classical measurement error in just one explanatory variable attenuates es-
timates of the effect of this variable on outcomes.
Second, even if the error, µ, is correlated with the true x∗, but is uncorrelated
with ε, the proportional downward bias is equal to the regression coefficient from
a hypothetical regression of β on the set of measured x′s. If there is only one
independent variable in the model, this reduce to the simple regression coefficient
βµx,
βyx = β[1− βµx] (3.16)
In the case of classical measurement error, βµx will be between 0 and 1; in general
this is not true and if µ and x are negatively correlated (the error µ is mean
reverting), βµx will be smaller than in the classical case and can also be negative.
Third, if the dependent variable is measured with error and the error is correlated
with the true y∗ and the x∗ in measured without error, then the proportional bias
in estimating β is equal to the regression coefficient βυy.
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3.4 Evidence from Italy
The aim of this analysis is to establish whether measures of inequality and mo-
bility from SHIW are biased estimates of inequality and mobility that would be
obtained from administrative records and to verify if the measurement error is
classical or non classical. We apply the model (3.2) to measure inequality and mo-
bility estimated from reported earnings in SHIW and from administrative records
contained in the WHIP data-set.
3.4.1 Data Description
We use data from the “2004” wave of two independent sources: the ”Survey on
Household Income and Wealth” (SHIW) and the ”Work Histories Italian Panel”
(WHIP)9.
The SHIW is a survey conducted by the Bank of Italy available at odd years from
1987 based on a random sample of approximately 8,000 household. Starting from
the 1989 wave a part of sample is made up of household with previous experi-
ence of SHIW participation, the so-called panel households. The survey contains
information on net earnings and other individual characteristics (i.e educational
attainment, occupation, sex and etc).
The WHIP is a data-set of workers, based on INPS administrative archives. The
reference population is of about 370,000 people. It covers a period from 1985
to 2004. It contains several information among which private employee working
contracts, gross earnings, self-employment activities as artisan, trader, the geo-
graphical area where employment was performed. Workers of the public sector
and self-employed (e.g. lawyers or notaries) are not contained in WHIP.
In order to make a match between SHIW and WHIP we would need of a code
which permit me to select the same individual in both data-sets (Gottschalk and
9We select the “2004” wave because it is the last one in the WHIP data set.
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Huynh (2006) match the data on the basis of the self reported social security num-
bers).
In our case, we have not a similar information so we have to make use of a pseudo-
matching methodology. We select from both data sets observations with the same
characteristics with respect year of birth, sex and occupational status (this vari-
able can assume five values: blue-collar, office worker,middle management and top
manager). As regards earnings we use the gross earnings.
We drop from the WHIP data-set foreign workers because in SHIW there are only
Italian individuals. The sample includes workers, aged from 16 to 65 years with
positive yearly gross earnings10. To compute the present value of real earnings I
use the consumer price index of 2004.
In line with the literature, we take logarithms of the earning variables, thus as-
serting that measurement error is proportional.
3.4.2 Inequality Measures
Table 3.1 presents some summary statistics: means and variances of log earnings
for the WHIP and SHIW data set and the mean and variance for measurement
error11. The results show that the variance of survey earnings is not large but,
the SHIW data provide an overestimate of the mean administrative earnings. Fur-
thermore, the variance in measurement error is very large (1.40).
If measurement error was classical, the large variance in measurement error would
lead to a substantially greater measure of inequality in the SHIW than in the
WHIP, but Table 3.1 shows exactly the opposite. The variance of log earnings in
WHIP is larger than the variance in SHIW (1.00 vs 0.40) and this is suggests that
the measurement error is mean reverting.
Table 3.2 shows the means and variances of log earnings in the WHIP and SHIW
breaking up the whole sample by three demographic characteristics: gender, ge-
ographical area of job and age. We observe that SHIW estimates of the mean
10SHIW data set contains the net value of earnings, the gross one derived from a procedure
used by the research office of the Bank of Italy.
11The bootstrap method is used to calculate the weighted variance of survey log earnings.
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Table 3.1: Mean and Variance of Log Earnings and Measurement
Error (Results for 2004).
Log Earnings Mean Variance N.Obs.
WHIP 9.47 1.00 64320
SHIW 9.64 0.40 5335
Measurement Error 0.17 1.40
earnings are higher than WHIP estimates also decomposing by demographic char-
acteristics. The Table 3.2 displays that all demographic groups have higher mean
earnings in the SHIW than the WHIP. The differences in means across data sets
are of different magnitude for each demographic groups, in particular for the age
group.
As regards the variances of earnings, the general patterns hold within demographic
groups since the variance is lower in the SHIW than the WHIP for all groups. Fur-
thermore, the magnitude of the differences are similar across demographic groups.
In conclusion, the SHIW yields lower estimates of the variance of log earnings
than the WHIP, even within demographic cells. This results corroborate the find-
ing that measurement error is non classical.
Table 3.2: Mean and Variance of Log Earnings and Measurement
Error by Demographic Groups
Mean Variance
WHIP SHIW Meas. Error WHIP SHIW Meas. Error
Men 9.62 9.74 0.12 0.93 0.36 1.27
Women 9.22 9.47 0.23 1.02 0.42 1.42
Geographical Area
North-West 9.63 9.78 0.14 0.88 0.33 1.20
North-East 9.53 9.66 0.12 0.91 0.30 1.22
Center 9.43 9.73 0.28 1.11 0.42 1.53
South 9.21 9.46 0.23 1.05 0.41 1.48
Island 9.21 9.27 0.07 1.07 0.55 1.64
Ages
30-40 9.46 9.63 0.07 0.78 0.35 1.18
40-50 9.67 9.74 0.02 0.72 0.34 1.14
50-60 9.75 9.78 0.02 0.81 0.48 1.33
60-70 9.19 9.72 0.50 1.65 0.77 2.39
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3.4.3 Mobility Measures
Table 3.3 reports the estimates of the inter-temporal elasticity of earnings, βˆ, and
the correlation coefficient, ρˆ. The value of βˆ for WHIP data is 0.71 while for SHIW
data is 0.62 suggesting that earnings in SHIW display a higher level of mobility
and thus that measurement error is classical12.
However, the correlations are similar in the two data-sets (0.73 vs 0.74). This
result is qualitatively similar to the findings of Gottschalk and Huynh (2006) on
SIPP-DER data sets. They suppose that this result is due to another source of
non classical measurement error.
Table 3.3: Elasticity and Correlation. Standard errors are in paren-
thesis.
Elasticity Correlation
WHIP 0.714
(0.002)
0.73
SHIW 0.62
(0.019)
0.74
In addition, Table 3.4 provides the estimates of these mobility indices for the same
demographic groups presented in Table 3.2. Also in this case the results for the
full sample are replicated within demographic groups. The comparison between βˆ
and ρˆ across data sets highlights small differences especially for ρˆ.
From these results we can conclude that, using earnings in SHIW, we overestimate
the level of mobility13.
Despite it, looking at the correlation coefficient, we obtain a similar measure of
mobility from both data-sets but this not means that measurement error is small.
In fact the large variance of measurement error shown in Table 3.1 for the whole
sample is also found within demographic groups leading to large attenuation bias
12Using the bootstrap procedure I test the null hypothesis of equality between the two βˆ. Since
the two sample have a different number of observations, I use a test proposed by Behrens-Fisher
(see Efron and Tibshirani (1993), pp. 221-223). At a 0.5% level of confidence I can reject the
null hypothesis.
13We measure mobility using also synthetic indexes, such as the Shorrocks and Bartholomew
indexes, and we obtain a higher level of mobility in reported earnings than in “true” earnings.
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Table 3.4: Elasticity and Correlation by Demographic Groups.
Elasticity Correlation
WHIP SHIW Meas. Error WHIP SHIW Meas. Error
Men 0.72 0.60 -0.12 0.74 0.79 0.02
Women 0.67 0.57 -0.10 0.68 0.66 -0.02
Geographical Area
North-West 0.72 0.53 -0.19 0.74 0.72 -0.02
North-East 0.73 0.68 -0.05 0.75 0.66 -0.09
Center 0.72 0.62 -0.10 0.75 0.81 0.06
South 0.65 0.44 -0.21 0.66 0.68 0.02
Island 0.66 0.85 0.19 0.66 0.78 0.12
Ages
30-40 0.71 0.59 -0.12 0.72 0.86 0.14
40-50 0.81 0.63 -0.18 0.85 0.75 -0.10
50-60 0.83 0.88 0.05 0.78 0.67 -0.11
60-70 0.85 0.17 -0.68 0.79 1.00 0.21
if measurement error were classical. The fact that mobility measures are similar
in the two data-sets implies that the non-classical measurement error offsets the
attenuation bias (Gottschalk and Huynh (2006)).
3.4.4 Inside Measurement Error
Table 3.5 shows the estimates of parameters of Eq.(3.8). The negative sign of
the first two elements (βνy∗ and βµy∗−1) confirms that measurement error is mean
reverting and that the variance of log earnings is smaller in SHIW than in WHIP.
The net effect of mean reversion (βνy∗ - βµy∗−1), that affects the estimate of βˆ, is
small and positive, thus the mean reversion has a small impact on SHIW estimates
of mobility.
The second bias, (βνy∗ − βνε), of the estimate of the inter-temporal elasticity
of earnings is negative because the deviation from expected earnings, ε, leads
to a smaller reduction in measurement error than the mean reversion in actual
earnings. This result tends to decrease the correlation in reported earnings across
time. However, the magnitude of this effect is equal to the magnitude of the first
one, hence they are balanced.
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Finally, the effect of the third bias in Eq.(3.8) is positive because both βνµ and
βεµ are positive but they are not sufficiently strong to offset the standard source
of attenuation bias, given by −β(σ2µ/σ2y−1).
These findings show that the factors that could offset the attenuation bias of
classical measurement error have not a great effect and the estimate of mobility
result overestimate as predict by the classical measurement error.
Table 3.5: Structure of Measurement Error. Standard error are in
parenthesis.
Estimate
βνy∗ −0.34
(0.01)
βµy∗−1 −0.07
(0.005)
βνε 0.004
(0.005)
βνµ 0.19
(0.007)
βεµ 0.005
(0.01)
3.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we used data from two different data sources: the Survey on House-
hold Income and Wealth (SHIW) and the Work Histories Italian Panel (WHIP)
for the year “2004” in order to explore the impact of measurement error (classical
and non classical) on the earnings dynamics in Italy. The aim is to provide a
contribution to the empirical literature on the role of measurement error in the
Survey data. Measurement error emerged, in fact, as an important factor that can
bias even simple estimations. In particular, with regard to the study of earnings
inequality and mobility, the classical measurement error tend to overstate true in-
equality and mobility but, several empirical studies suggest that the assumptions,
underling classical measurement error, in earnings data are inappropriate. The
most important results of these studies are that measurement error in earnings is
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negatively correlated with true earnings (mean reverting) and positively autocor-
related over time. The strength of these results induce us to consider non classical
measurement error as an important offsetting factor.
The principal difference between the two types of measurement error is that for-
mer leads to an overestimate both of inequality and mobility while the latter can
lead to downward bias in estimates which offsets the increased variance from the
classical measurement error. In this chapter, we show that, as expected, in SHIW
earnings there is measurement error but it is far from classical. The fact that the
SHIW shows lower values of σˆ2 than the WHIP reflects strong mean reversion in
measurement error which more than offsets the inequality increasing effect of the
large variance of measurement error. Intertemporal elasticity of earnings in SHIW
appears lower than that in WHIP suggesting the presence of classical measure-
ment error, while the value of the correlation coefficients is very similar in the two
data sets revealing non classical measurement error. The net-impact of it is that
inequality is underestimated in SHIW, whereas mobility is affected much less than
inequality by measurement error.
Conclusions
Socioeconomic mobility is a very complex concept. It has various features and
different implications in terms of social welfare. Mobility can be considered as a
Good Thing because it reduces the association between the socioeconomic status
of origin and those of destination over time so that the underlying degree of per-
sistent inequality (and poverty) is significantly lower than current inequality (and
poverty). However, mobility is not necessarily desirable. Mobility signals uncer-
tainty about individual’s status prospects; since people are generally risk-averse,
mobility can be a Bad Thing. An increase in mobility makes thing worse.
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate some issues of socioeconomic mobility
making an application to Italy. The analysis explores both the level of intergener-
ational and intragenerational mobility. The former, analysed in the first chapter,
deals with the position of one individual in the social hierarchy in relation to that
of his parents at a similar point in his life. It is measured in terms of educational
attainment and occupational status.
Italy, during the period 1998-2010, appears as a less mobile society. In particular,
the persistence in each educational class increases and it is increasingly difficult
for a child with a father with a high level of education to obtain a higher edu-
cational attainment. Occupational mobility therefore displays a downward trend.
Moreover, it seems that a large part of the measured mobility is due to changes
in the occupational structure and not to the forces making for social mobility.
The latter, studied in the second chapter, concerns the individual’s changes in
social status over the lifetime or the work carrier. Using novel methodologies to
estimate income mobility based on non-parametric methods, I show that Italy is
far to be a Perfect Mobile Society. In general, Italian individuals are character-
ized by a low level of intragenerational mobility with respect to other countries
(for example with respect to U.S.A.), and income mobility is high at the extreme
bounds of the distribution, but low in the middle.
In addition, the mobility concept is related to the inequality concept. Mobility
can be considered as an instrument that reduces inequality as the reference period
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for income is lengthened from one year to a longer period (Shorrocks (1978a)).
In this context, the second chapter presents a very preliminary analysis of the
relationship between income inequality and income mobility. The result displays
that the observed increase in income inequality in 1987-2010 is not balanced by
any increase in income mobility.
The last issue, covered in this thesis, deals with the problem of measurement error.
Income data, in fact, are often measured with errors caused both by the respon-
dents and by the survey process. It is commonly suppose that measurement error
in income is “classical”. That is, it is assumed that error in a given variable is un-
correlated with the true level of that and all other variables in the model and the
stochastic disturbance. However, in the dataset used in this dissertation there is
evidence of the presence of ’non-classical’ measurement error. Non-classical mea-
surement error means that errors are negatively correlated with incomes level: low
earners tend to over-report their incomes and high earners tend to under-report
(the case of mean-reversion). This type of measurement error offsets the impact
on inequality of classical errors, while mobility appears to be much less affected
than inequality.
Concluding, this thesis can be considered as the starting point to the study of
mobility since there are others important aspects of mobility that should be inter-
esting to analyse, both in relation to inequality and poverty.
Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Descriptive Data
In this section we present some descriptive results.
Table A.1: Number of Observations for educational and occupational
classes for children in each cohort.
Cohort I Cohort II Cohort III
CS 2579 2095 1137
USS 1785 2238 1336
UD 608 630 428
UN 213 212 130
BC 1117 1420 1020
SE&FB 207 182 98
OAW 382 424 198
OW&T 1244 1442 793
MP 248 293 119
M&M 429 365 142
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Table A.2: Number of Observations for educational and occupational
classes for fathers in each cohort.
Cohort I Cohort II Cohort III
CS 4457 4262 2330
USS 346 489 430
UD 169 212 141
UN 69 74 57
BC 2013 2223 1249
SE&FB 83 93 60
OAW 847 810 446
OW&T 552 752 477
MP 77 133 74
M&M 206 253 137
A.2 Comparison between Census of ISTAT and
the Sample SHIW for occupations
In this section we show that the size distribution of occupations derived by various
censuses of ISTAT broadly matches the size distribution of our sample derived by
SHIW.
Table A.3: Census of ISTAT vs our sample derived by SHIW (per-
centage of workers in each occupation)
Year of census\Occupation MP&SE OAW. MM&BC&OW&T
1971 0.020 0.207 0.771
1981 0.034 0.171 0.793
1991 0.071 0.179 0.747
2001 0.076 0.166 0.756
SHIW 1998 0.117 0.108 0.774
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A.3 Average and Median Income and Standard
Deviation of Log Income for occupations
In this section we show the ranking of the occupational classes according to the
mean and median income of children.
Table A.4: Mean, median and standard deviation of incomes in Co-
hort I
Mean Median SD N.Obs
BC 13361.13 13428 5157.5 1367
SE&FB 25470.12 15111 55194 234
OAW 17838.17 15494 12232.4 467
OW&T 17666.9 16671 6201.7 1437
MP 33338.26 25000 29124.1 254
M&M 30474.2 25823 17661.2 492
Table A.5: Mean, median and standard deviation of incomes
in Cohort II
Mean Median SD N.Obs
BC 13696 13944.1 5124.8 1778
SE&FB 22958 15000 22879.2 209
OAW 19114 15300 23762.6 494
OW&T 17678 16526 6810.2 1641
MP 27619 20000 28863.8 323
M&M 32751 28000 22879.6 411
Table A.6: Mean, median and standard deviation of incomes
in Cohort III
Mean Median SD N.Obs.
BC 13720 13428 5537.6 1260
OW&T 17068 16000 6521.7 957
OAW 19562 16000 16514.1 239
SE&FB 32779 17000 90496.8 113
MP 22116 18076 22223.9 140
M&M 25245 23000 11010.5 170
Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Adaptive Kernel Estimates.
The kernel density estimator can be considered as a viewing window that slides
over the data and the estimate of the density depends on the number of observa-
tions that fall into the window (Pittau and Zelli (2002)).
When observations are scattered over the support of the distribution, we ca not
use a fixed bandwidth in density estimation since we want to estimate long-tailed
or multi-modal density function. The fixed bandwidth approach may result in
under-smoothing in areas with only sparse observations while over-smoothing in
others. The adaptive kernel estimation is a two-stage procedure which mitigates
this problem (see Silverman (1986), p. 101).
The general strategy used is the following: given a multivariate data set X =
X1, ..., Xn and a vector of sample weights W = ω1, ..., ωn, where Xi is a vector of
dimension d and
∑n
i=1 ωi = 1, first we have to run the pilot estimate:
f˜(x) =
1
n det(H)
n∑
i=1
ωik{H−1(x−Xi)} (B.1)
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where k(u) = (2pi)−1exp(−1/2u) is Gaussian kernel. The estimate of the density
function at each point is determined directly from the sample data, without as-
suming any functional form a priori. The restriction on the kernel function K(-)
is to be nonnegative and integrated to 1 over its support. Any probability density
function satisfies this condition and, as a general rule, the kernel estimates do not
depend much on the kernel chosen. For large samples, any kernel function will be
close to an optimal one, thus the choice of kernel is a minor issue ?.
The bandwidth matrix H is a diagonal matrix (d × d) with diagonal elements
(h1, ..., hd) given by the optimal normal bandwidths, i.e. hi = [4/(d+2)]
1/(d+4)σˆin
1/(d+4);
σˆ is the estimated standard error of the distribution of Xi. The use of a diago-
nal bandwidth matrix instead of a full covariance matrix follows the suggestions in
Wand and Jones (1993). In the case of d = 2 we haveH = det(H) = (1)1/6n−1/6σˆ.
In the mobility estimate W = {pi, ..., pn}, where pi is the weight associated to each
individual i. We then define local bandwidth factors λi by:
λi = [f˜(Xi)/g]
α (B.2)
where log(g) =
∑n
i=1 ωi log(f˜(Xi)) and α ∈ [0, 1] is a sensitivity parameter. We
set α = 1/2 as suggested by Silverman (1986), 103. Finally the adaptive kernel
estimate fˆ(x) is defined as:
fˆ(x) =
1
n det(H)
n∑
i=1
λ−di ωik{λ−1i H−1(x−Xi)} (B.3)
The Gaussian kernel guarantees that the number of modes is a decreasing function
of the bandwidth; such a property is at the basis of the test for unimodality (see
Silverman (1986)).
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B.2 Derivation of the linear model
To derive Eq.(2.1) start with the following equation:
log(y˜it) = β log(y˜it−1) + ηt (B.4)
where y˜it is equal to yit/y¯t and y˜it−1 is equal to yit−1/y¯t−1. Replacing into Eq.(B.4):
log(yit)− log(y¯t) = β(log(yit−1)− log(y¯t−1)) + ηt = β log(yit−1) + log(y¯t/y¯βt−1) + ηt
(B.5)
Assuming that y¯t = (1 + g)y¯t−1, where g is a growth rate, we obtain:
log(yit) = [β log(yit−1)] + log[(1 + g)y¯t−1]− [β log((1 + g)y¯t−1)] + ηt, (B.6)
Rewriting:
log(yit) = β log(yit−1) + log(1 + g) + [(1− β) log(y¯t−1)] + ηt, (B.7)
We assume that α = log(1 + g) + [(1−β) log(y¯t−1)] where the first term represents
the deterministic trend which increases earnings at time t thanks to common
growth whereas, the second term represents an omitted variable.
Finally we obtain the following equation:
log(yit) = α + β log(yit−1) + ηt (B.8)
To verify the stationarity of this model, we estimate it and we find a βˆ < 1
suggesting that the model converges toward the steady state.
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